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ABSTRACT1
There has been an increasing effort to improve the behavioural realism of mathematical models of2
choice, resulting in efforts to move away from random utility maximisation (RUM) models. Some3
new insights have been generated with, for example, models based on random regret minimisation4
(RRM, µ-RRM). Notwithstanding work using for example Decision Field Theory (DFT), many of5
the alternatives to RUM tested on real-world data have however only looked at only modest de-6
partures from RUM, and differences in results have consequently been small. In the present study,7
we address this research gap again by investigating the applicability of models based on quantum8
theory. These models, which are substantially different from the state-of-the-art choice modelling9
techniques, emphasise the importance of contextual effects, state dependence, interferences and10
the impact of choice or question order. As a result, quantum probability models have had some11
success in better explaining several phenomena in cognitive psychology. In this paper, we con-12
sider how best to operationalise quantum probability into a choice model. Additionally, we test13
the quantum model frameworks on a best/worst route choice dataset and demonstrate that they find14
useful transformations to capture differences between the attributes important in a most favoured15
alternative compared to that of the least favoured alternative. Similar transformations can also be16
used to efficiently capture contextual effects in a dataset where the order of the attributes and al-17
ternatives are manipulated. Overall, it appears that models incorporating quantum concepts hold18
significant promise in improving the state-of-the-art travel choice modelling paradigm through19
their adaptability and efficient modelling of contextual changes.20
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1. INTRODUCTION1
The random utility maximisation (RUM) framework has dominated the travel choice modelling2
field for many decades. More recently, RUM has been criticised as being inadequate in explain-3
ing the full range of behavioural complexity (Chorus et al., 2008; Guevara and Fukushi, 2016).4
This has resulted in many attempts to better incorporate behavioural concepts into travel behaviour5
models, including regret (Chorus et al., 2008; Chorus, 2010), contextual relative advantages (Leong6
and Hensher, 2014) and prospect theory (Avineri and Bovy, 2008). However, none of these de-7
velopments have yet rivalled RUM as the preferred model in real-world applications. This is due8
to difficulties that quickly arise once a modeller departs from the firm economic foundations of9
RUM (Hess et al., 2018). Consequently, caution is required if we are to step away from random10
utility models. Departures to models with similar underlying structures, i.e. those with the same11
error structure such as random regret minimisation (Chorus et al., 2008; Chorus, 2010), result in12
only small differences whilst facing the same key disadvantage of all departures from (linear in13
attribute) RUM, the loss of the ability to calculate welfare measures (for a further discussion on14
welfare analysis with non-linear effects, see e.g. Batley and Dekker (2019) and for regret models,15
see Dekker 2014). Departures to more different models, such as decision field theory (Busemeyer16
and Townsend, 1992), whilst sometimes finding improvements in model fit, additionally result17
in models that become computationally infeasible for large-scale datasets (Hancock et al., 2018).18
Thus, if we are to move away from RUM, we need to investigate alternative approaches that are19
computationally simpler yet better reflect behavioural realism. This leads us to explore and com-20
pare dynamical modelling ideas from other disciplines which are further away from the tried and21
tested. Given the success of using concepts from quantum physics in cognitive psychology, one22
possible alternative is to see if quantum physics can make a similar step into travel behaviour23
modelling. A fundamental aspect of quantum-like models is that they are intrinsically probabilis-24
tic. While in, for example, RUM and RRM, a stochastic sampling of the utility function is added25
to the model to produce probabilistic output, a quantum-like choice model instead implements the26
stochasticity at the foundation of the decision process in the mind of the individual decision-maker.27
Quantum physics, first considered in the early 20th century, was originally developed to ac-28
count for phenomena and results that could not be explained by classical theories of probability29
and physics. In particular, physicists noticed that the measurement of one variable could impact the30
measurement of another. One of the archetypal experiments of quantum mechanics is the double-31
slit scattering experiment (Feynman et al., 1965). In this experiment, either a beam of light or32
particles is projected on a screen with two fine parallel slits. Further behind the slit-screen, the33
intensity of the scattered beam is measured across the receptor screen, in the same direction as the34
slits are separated (Figure 1). When light waves are applied in this experiment, an intensity pattern35
emerges on the receptor screen which shows both diffraction, caused by light scattering within36
each slit, and interference, caused by compounding the light waves coming from the two differ-37
ent slits. The major surprise comes from the fact that these same patterns also occur for beams38
of material particles - e.g. neutrons or heavy molecules. Even when the source is so scarce that39
one can legitimately assume that only a single particle at once crosses the two slits, a diffraction40
and interference pattern will still over time build up on the detection screen. Not only does the41
double-slit experiment prove that matter behaves as waves, but it also shows that a single particle42
can have non-compatible properties - like being at different locations A and B at the same time.43
This potential for ‘non-locality’ of a particle ensues the particle must be at position A and B at the44
same time in order to produce wave-like interference pattern over the positions C on the detector45
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screen (Figure 1). It has been shown that as soon as the presence of the particle at either of the slits1




FIGURE 1 : The double-slit experiment (top view). Plain waves are scattered through the double-
slit screen (A and B) and produce a diffraction and interference pattern of intensity on the detection
screen (C, located at a zero point of the intensity). The dashed line indicates the intensity resulting
from single-slit diffraction.
In the double-slit experiment, we can measure for the outcome of the (statistical) propositions3
{a,b,c}.4
a : ‘the particle is present at A’5
b : ‘the particle is present at B’6
c : ‘the particle is never present at C’ ( C is at a zero-point of the interference pattern)7
Let us suppose single particles repeatedly and individually enter the double-slit device (proposition8
a or b is true) and we do not observe a particle at C (proposition c is true). Then the outcomes9
for (a∨ b) and c are both true. Then, by the distributivity law of classical logic, this means that10
((c∧ a)∨ (c∧ b)) is also true. However, if we evaluate these two expressions according to the11
procedures of quantum probability, they both are false. First, the proposition (c∧a) is false because12
the procedure shows a particle is never observed at C if we have an affirmative observation of the13
particle at A, while a non-observation of the particle at location A must set the particle affirmatively14
at location B and again excludes proposition c. By the same token the (c∧b) is false, since never15
observing a particle at C means the particle cannot have been observed at either of the slits. Thus,16
for this experiment, (c∧a)∨ (c∧b) is false, an explicit contradiction of the outcome of c∧ (a∨b).17
This particular example clearly exposes that the classical distributivity rule of ‘and’ and ‘or’ does18
not apply for non-compatible features in quantum theory.19
These findings resulted in the creation of a new theory of probability, known as quantum logic20
(Birkhoff and Von Neumann, 1936). Under quantum logic (which is also known as quantum prob-21
ability), a new set of probability rules were defined, which crucially did not include the axiom of22
1See also Englert (1996) and Greenberger and Yasin (1988) for the expression of the gradual relation between
interference visibility and position predictability.
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distributivity. This new theory of probability has subsequently made the transition into cognitive1
psychology (Bruza et al., 2015) and has also been introduced into transport behaviour modelling.2
For example, Vitetta (2016) introduced a quantum model based on random utility models with3
the addition of an interference term for route choice problems. Additionally, Yu and Jayakrish-4
nan (2018) demonstrated that quantum cognition models can be used effectively to capture the5
difference in state of mind between choices made under stated preference and revealed preference6
settings. However, as far as the authors are aware, there has not been an actual choice model devel-7
oped with quantum concepts that incorporates attribute values for individual alternatives and can8
work for general choices as well as ‘changes in perspective’. Thus, the focus of this paper is to9
explore ways to develop a choice modelling framework based on quantum probability theory that10
can be used for choices in general, as well as efficiently capturing effects caused by ordering and11
context, by engendering interference and rotation effects which adequately reflect the changes in12
the ‘state of mind’ of the respondents.13
In our present study, we will present two quantum models using distinct approaches. The first14
model, named the ‘amplitude model’, is an innovative approach related to geometrically based15
quantum-like models. In (all) quantum-like models the belief-action state of a respondent is de-16
scribed by a vector in a Hilbert space. The amplitude components of the vector represent the latent17
motivation to choose each of the alternatives. In essence, the ‘amplitude model’ implements the18
expressions of utility (or regret) immediately in the amplitudes of the belief-action state of a re-19
spondent. As such, the amplitude model puts the support for each of the alternatives in a trial20
directly at the level of a measurable quantity, the probability (amplitude).21
The second model, designated as the ‘Hamiltonian model’, is based on a dynamic principle22
in which the change of the belief state results from attribute comparisons of the alternatives. In23
this model, therefore, the ‘deliberation process’ itself is implemented. The dynamic approach to24
quantum-like modelling uses the ‘energy operator’, or Hamiltonian, of quantum mechanics to im-25
plement the change of the belief state over time. The changes are caused by the information in26
(and effects from) the input, such as descriptions, questions and choice alternatives or other pre-27
sented sensory resources (Pothos and Busemeyer, 2009; Atmanspacher and Filk, 2010; Martínez-28
Martínez, 2014; White et al., 2014). In our present study the expressions of utility or regret are29
implemented in the phenomenological Hamiltonian. This Hamiltonian then causes the evolution30
of the initial belief-action state of the respondent towards the informed state in which the decision31
is made.32
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. First, we introduce quantum probability33
theory and discuss the relative benefits of using such a system. We then mathematically describe34
quantum probability theory, discussing how it can be incorporated into a choice model and de-35
tailing two different formulations for new models. We next test the performance of our proposed36
models against typical choice models such as multinomial logit, random regret minimisation and37
also decision field theory, in the context of travel decisions. Finally, we test the use of ‘quantum38
rotations’ on best-worst and contextual choice data, before drawing some conclusions.39
2. QUANTUM PROBABILITY THEORY40
In this section, we first give a general overview of quantum probability theory. We then give41
the mathematical definitions for how quantum probability theory works for basic choices. We42
conclude by describing how it works for a series of related choices. It is in the transformation from43
one choice task to another that a modelling framework based on quantum probability theory looks44
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very different from traditional choice models.1
2.1. Overview of quantum probability theory2
A simple example of how quantum probability theory works is given in Figure 2. Initially, a3
decision-maker might be making a single choice between two alternatives, travelling by car or by4
train. Each of these alternatives is represented by vectors, |T 〉 and |C〉 respectively (the axes in5
Figure 2). Under quantum probability theory, the decision-maker has some belief state, denoted6
|z〉, regarding whether they will choose car or train.7
FIGURE 2 : Schematic representation of the belief state in the geometric quantum-like model for
a binary choice ‘Train’ or ‘Car’. The belief state |Z〉 is a superposition of |T 〉 and |C〉, expressing
support for both the choice of Train and Car. The (modulus of the) complex-valued amplitudes of
the projections on the respective axes provides the probabilities of each alternative by squaring the
projection lengths |ψT | and |ψC|. In this schematic representation, the units on the axes are reals
and the normalised belief state is a point on the unit circle.2The cosine-similarity of the overall
belief state and the ‘Train’ choice outcome is given by |ψT |= |〈T |Z〉|.
The action of making a choice (or equivalently coming to some result or making a judgement)8
results in a reduction of the state. This can be represented graphically by projecting the belief state9
vector onto the vector corresponding to the chosen alternative. In this example, ψT , represents the10
scalar projection of |z〉 onto the unambiguous state |T 〉 for choosing the train. The ‘length’ of this11
projection is then denoted |ψT |. In Figure 2, these projections are directly over the corresponding12
vectors, and on the axes we denoted the norm of the respective amplitudes.13
For example, when the belief state vector is at 45 degrees (with respect to the Car and Train14
axes), the two projections are of equal length and the choice probabilities are thus 50% each. In the15
example in Figure 2, the car alternative has a higher probability since it shows a larger amplitude16
than the train component. The full mathematical description for this is given in the following17
section on a basic choice under quantum probability theory, which also gives a 3-dimensional18
example. The ‘longer’ the projection onto the vector for an alternative, the more likely it is for19
that alternative to be chosen. The crucial difference in using such a system is how an additional20
question or nudge can impact the decision-maker’s choice for the first question (car or train). If,21
2This schematic representation should not be confused with the Bloch sphere representation for the spin-1/2 particle
in quantum mechanics.
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for example, the decision-maker was asked ‘are you environmentally friendly?’ before they had1
made up their mind between the choice of car or train, they would then be initially answering a2
different question and making a different choice. As a result of the decision-maker deciding ‘I am3
environmentally friendly’, the decision-maker’s state moves from the initial starting state and is4
projected onto the vector representing ‘environmentally friendly’ and vice versa if they decide ‘I5
am not environmentally friendly’ (see Figure 3). This results in making the choice between car6
and train from a different state. Consequently, the length of the projections (|ψC| and |ψT |) onto7
the vectors for car and train have changed. This is graphically represented in Figure 3, with the8
projection length |ψT | being longer if the initial state is first projected onto the environmentally9
friendly vector before being projected onto the train vector, relative to the projection length if train10
























FIGURE 3 : Schematic representation of making two consecutive binary choices under quan-
tum probability theory in the geometric quantum-like model; first ‘Environmentally friendly’ or
‘Environmentally unfriendly’, followed by ‘Train’ or ‘Car’. The preparatory ecological question
recasts the belief state on the basis {|F〉, |U〉} and will increase the belief support for the choice
‘Train’ on a positive outcome for ‘Environmentally Friendly’ since the amplitude norm |ψT |, in
pink, is then larger than amplitude norm |ψT |, in black, and the reverse is true for ‘Car’. Notice that
while the initial belief state |Z〉 only had some latent tendency for responding ‘Environmentally
Friendly’, after the positive outcome the updated belief state coincides with the environmentally
friendly belief state |F〉 (pink arrow).
Cognitive psychologists have discussed many key reasons for using quantum probability theory13
within cognitive modelling (Busemeyer et al., 2011), with many of these reasons also being trans-14
ferable and relevant within travel behaviour modelling. Firstly, a belief state is most often initially15
‘indefinite’; it may either have some underlying preference in favour of an alternative or it may16
express uniform indifference with respect to the alternatives. This may come about due to dis-17
torted processing or lack of proper informative input. Furthermore, the final belief state is also18
in many instances created rather than just recorded by an effort to measure it. For example, a19
decision-maker might only start considering how environmentally friendly they are after they have20
been asked (or reminded) about how environmentally friendly they are (White et al., 2014). For21
this reason, it is often seen as essential that surveys including both choice tasks and attitudinal22
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questions require the respondent to complete the choice tasks first if the researcher wishes to avoid1
bias in the choice task (Ben-Akiva et al., 2019). However, conversely, a decision-maker may try2
to ‘justify’ their choices with their responses to the attitudinal questions (Cunha-e Sá et al., 2012).3
Consequently, it is difficult to measure a decision-maker’s ‘true’ attitudes, opinions and preference4
without some form of bias. It is easy to see how this relates to issues for choice modellers with, for5
example, analysts often having concerns about the biases or truthfulness within stated preference6
data (Mahieu et al., 2016).7
Secondly, psychologists have put forward the argument that cognition behaves like a rip-8
pling wave pattern rather than a classical particle trajectory (Trueblood and Busemeyer, 2012). A9
decision-maker might consider the advantages of getting the train but then also consider the advan-10
tages of driving. Indeed, many models developed in mathematical psychology assume preferences11
for alternatives that update stochastically (Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993; Krajbich et al., 2012).12
Under quantum probability theory, preference over time ‘behaves like a wave’ and consequently13
exhibits interference patterns and fluctuates over time. It is only when a decision-maker makes14
up their mind and makes a decision that their preference exists as some measurable definite state.15
Before an action or choice is made, an observer does not know for sure what the decision-maker16
will do. There are many preference states within travel behaviour that could similarly be described17
as ‘wave-like’, such as anticipating merging onto a new lane when driving, changing travel mode18
when the weather worsens, or choosing which route to take depending on traffic conditions.19
One of the most crucial quantum concepts, however, is the idea of interferences, as e.g. change20
caused by nudges (such as the previous example of being asked about the environment whilst in the21
process of making a mode choice). After the development of quantum physics to explain ordering22
effects of observed variables (Birkhoff and Von Neumann, 1936), a wide range of quantum mod-23
els, often based on the idea of quantum interference, have been put forward in cognitive psychol-24
ogy (Bruza et al., 2015). These include a quantum model to explain ordering effects (Trueblood25
and Busemeyer, 2011), a quantum similarity model (Pothos et al., 2013), a quantum judgement26
model (Busemeyer et al., 2011) and the disjunction effect in the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Moreira and27
Wichert, 2016) and in the two-stage gamble paradigm (Broekaert et al., 2020). These models per-28
form a similar function to choice models that include state dependence, where a number of different29
models (Seetharaman, 2003) have been applied to capture the temporal correlation of choices over30
time. Furthermore, should measurement data for both attitude and choice be provided, a higher31
dimensional representation could be built. Such models have been presented in the literature and32
have been applied in various contexts; e.g. for choice and confidence level (Kvam et al., 2015),33
for choice and categorisation (Busemeyer et al., 2009) and choice, confidence and response time34
(Busemeyer et al., 2006; Kempe, 2003). Given the success of quantum models at explaining or-35
dering effects within cognitive psychology, there is ample scope for quantum logic and quantum36
ideas within travel behaviour modelling and choice modelling in general.37
2.2. Choice making under quantum probability theory38
More formally, under quantum probability theory, a measurement (or choice scenario), X, can39
be related geometrically to a subspace Lx in a multidimensional complex-valued Hilbert
3 space40
3A Hilbert space is a vector space over the set of real or complex numbers C, (see e.g. Aerts and Gabora 2005).
It is the more general form of a Euclidean space, extended to allow for complex numbers and defined over multiple
(possibly infinite) dimensions and it is complete; i.e. a space for which convergent sums of vectors are again elements
of the vector space. For the work in this paper, our Hilbert space is n-dimensional, where n is the number of choice
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(Trueblood et al., 2014b). For each measurement, a number of discrete projection ‘events’ are1
possible. These projection events, if mutually exclusive, are related to orthonormal vectors4 in2
subspace Lx, which are denoted |x1〉, |x2〉, ... |xJ〉 (with J the number of alternatives). For these3
vectors, we use ‘bra-ket’ notation in keeping with the standard notation used in quantum mechanics4
and quantum cognition (c.f. Trueblood and Busemeyer 2011). Under bra-ket notation, a column5
vector in a Hilbert space is represented by a ‘ket’ vector, |·〉, with the corresponding row vector6
(with each element being complex conjugated) a ‘bra’ vector, 〈·| (see e.g. Yu and Jayakrishnan7
2018). This bra-ket convention simplifies the expression of the inproduct of two states, in particular8
the squared norm of a complex-valued vector |Z〉 is then given by the real 〈Z|Z〉.9
These orthonormal vectors, |xi〉, then form a basis for the subspace Lx. Consequently, the10
Hilbert space for a choice task with J alternatives can be represented by a J-dimensional space. This11
means that for a choice set where there are three alternatives, the Hilbert space is a 3-dimensional12













FIGURE 4 : Schematic representation of the belief state in the geometric quantum-like model for
a three-choice paradigm {‘Alt1’, ‘Alt2’, ‘Alt3’} on the unit sphere (see Equation 2). The squared
modulus of the amplitude obtained by projection on the axes for each alternative produces the
respective probability for that choice p(Alt j) = |ψ j|2.
A basic choice. Under quantum probability theory, a decision-maker has some ‘belief state’ re-14
garding their preferences over alternatives, which itself is probabilistic (in that a decision-maker15
inherently has some level of certainty over their preferences and opinions) and is denoted |z〉,16
which can be represented by a vector of unit length (see Figure 4). When a decision-maker makes17
a choice, their state goes from ‘indefinite’ to ‘definite’, by projecting onto the vector represent-18
ing the chosen alternative. This means that for each alternative Alt j, with subspace Lx j there is19








alternatives in a given choice task.
4More generally these can have more than one dimension, hence orthogonal subspaces should then be used.
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The choice probability, Pr[ j], for a specific alternative Alt j is given by the modulus square of1
the amplitude for that alternative appearing in the decision-maker’s belief state;52




|2 = |ψ j|2. (1)
Since we assume the presented alternatives exhaust all possible choices and each alternative is3





|ψ j|2 = 1, (2)
A visual check of this fact appears in Figure 4. The lengths of the three projections can be visu-6
alised as the three sides of the cuboid in 3-dimensional space in which Pythagoras’ theorem can be7
applied sequentially.8
A sequence of choices. If a decision-maker makes a second choice across a different set of9
alternatives, this choice may be influenced by the first. Quantum probability theory captures this10
influence by representing the two measurement events by two separate subspaces within the Hilbert11
space, Lx and Ly. Each subspace is separately defined by a set of orthonormal vectors representing12
the alternatives in each measurement event. This means that Lx is spanned by |x1〉, |x2〉, ... |xJ〉13
and Ly is spanned by |y1〉, |y2〉, ... |yK〉, where there are J alternatives for choice scenario X and14
K alternatives for scenario Y (while it must be assured that both scenarios span the same Hilbert15
space).16
Revisiting the example presented in Figure 3, a decision-maker might initially be making a17
choice between commuting by car or train. Under quantum probability theory, the decision-maker18
has some initial belief state, informed by past experience, regarding whether they will choose car19
or train. In this measurement event, all possible states are spanned by the basis vectors |xcar〉,20
|xtrain〉. The closer the vector representing the decision-maker’s state is to the vector representing21
an alternative, the more likely it is for that alternative to be chosen. However, the decision-maker22
could first be asked a different question (Y) about whether they consider themselves to be environ-23
mentally friendly or not. In the ‘change of perspective’ approach of quantum probability theory,24
the initial belief state does not change under the new perspective under question Y, but the refer-25
ence frame does. This means that the probabilities for alternatives being chosen in question Y are26
different from the probabilities for alternatives being chosen in question X because the choice in27
question Y is represented by a different set of basis vectors, |yenv− f riendly
〉
, |yenv−un f riendly
〉
. Con-28
sequently, if the decision-maker makes the choice ‘I am environmentally friendly’, their belief state29
moves through the Hilbert space, projected onto the environmentally friendly vector, |yenv− f riendly
〉
30
(see Figure 3). This means that their new belief state is the vector |yenv− f riendly
〉
itself. Hence, by31
making choice in question Y first, the original choice X between car and train is made from a32
different belief state.33
Crucially, by moving their belief state - through what we call a ‘quantum rotation’ - the size of34
5Using the bra-ket notation, one can easily see:
|Px j |z〉 |2 = | |x j〉〈x j|z〉|2 = 〈z|x j〉〈x j|x j〉〈x j|z〉= 〈z|x j〉〈x j|z〉= |〈z|x j〉|2
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the projected amplitudes onto the vectors for train and for car have changed.6 As a result, in this1
example, the decision-maker is more likely to choose to commute by train if they first decide that2
they are environmentally friendly. This is graphically represented in Figure 3, where the size of the3
projected amplitude onto the basis vector representing train being chosen has increased, resulting4
in an increased probability of choosing train.5
3. BUILDING A CHOICE MODEL FROM QUANTUM PROBABILITY THEORY6
Whilst Lipovetsky (2018) has applied quantum models to consumer recall tasks with multiple7
alternatives defined on multiple attributes, quantum probability has not ever been applied to multi-8
alternative, multi-attribute choice scenarios (as far as the authors are aware). In this section, we9
look at how we can use ideas from quantum probability within a choice model. We do this by10
first considering what the requirements are for a quantum choice model. Next, we formally define11
our two alternative quantum-like models, one based on an amplitude approach and the other on a12
Hamiltonian approach. We then consider how similar or related choice tasks could be mathemati-13
cally explained by a ‘quantum rotation’. Finally, we discuss a number of different value functions14
that we implement within both standard choice models and our new quantum choice models.15
For our choice model to use quantum probability theory, we need to define a method for con-16
structing an indefinite state vector. If this state vector is of unit length and we take projections17
from it to a set of orthonormal basis vectors (with one vector for each discrete alternative), then18
the sum of the squared length -more precisely the amplitude- of these projections will equal one.19
Consequently, for each alternative, we need to find the amplitude of the projection, as the square of20
this ‘length’ equals the probability with which the alternative is chosen (see Figure 4). This means21
that we must first consider how best to represent the state vector, |z〉.22
If, for example, we imagine that we are making a route choice between three alternatives, the23
development of a state could be represented by Figure 5. When the decision-maker considers24
factors favouring alternative 1, the state vector extends in the direction of the vector representing25
alternative 1 (and hence increasing the amplitude of the projection onto alternative 1). Similarly,26
the decision-maker may consider factors that favour alternatives 2 and 3, resulting in the state vec-27
tor extending in the direction of the vector for alternative 2 or 3. At some point, the decision-maker28
reaches some eventual state and makes the actual (probabilistic) choice.7 To generate this state, we29
need to know the relative importance of the attributes. This means that one option is to calculate30
‘value functions’ for each alternative. However, if we write the value functions, Vj = β
′x j, where31
β is a vector of coefficients and x j is a vector of observed variables relating to alternative j, then32
Vj can be positive or negative. As the probability of an alternative is the squared ‘length’ of the33
projection from the state vector onto the vector for the alternative, positive and negative values34
would lead to the same result. This means that care is required when defining how the relative35
values of the attributes impact the probability amplitudes.36
A further requirement for quantum models is some method for capturing underlying prefer-37
ences towards an alternative. In the representation for the development of an informed state in38
Figure 5, this simply means having some initial state that is still uninformed by the attributes, but39
6Two choices that require a different set of basis vectors are known as ‘incompatible’. If the choices are in fact
compatible and can be represented by the same set of basis vectors, then the order in which the choices are made has
no impact on the probabilities of each alternative being chosen. Consequently, quantum probability collapses back
into classical probability (Hughes, 1992).
7Note that this choice remains probabilistic unless the decision-maker is 100% certain about their choice.











FIGURE 5 : Schematic representation of the development of an informed belief state. The
quantum-like dynamical approach lets the ‘uninformed’ - or possibly biased - initial state evolve
to an informed state which leads to the final belief state underlying the probabilistic decision. In
the amplitude model this transformation is caused by the subjective utility comparisons immedi-
ately in the vector components, while in the Hamiltonian model these utility differences drive the
Hamiltonian operator of change over time.
is only based on underlying preferences towards an alternative. Thus, the initial state should be1
defined on some parameters that act equivalently to attribute specific constants. Then subsequently,2
from this initial state, the evolution happens when the decision-maker considers the attributes of3
the alternatives.4
3.1. The quantum-amplitude model5
Similar to geometric quantum models, the quantum-amplitude model is directed at implementing6
a specific functionality of the amplitude components of the belief-action state themselves. The7
innovative approach is to implement value functions for the attributes of the alternatives in the8
amplitudes. This approach will show an increased optimisation performance since the supporting9
factors for each of the alternatives are directly expressed in the choice probabilities - through the10
respective amplitudes.811
In geometric approaches, belief states are mostly real-valued vectors of the n-dimensional Eu-12
clidean space, e.g. Pothos et al. (2013); van Rijsbergen (2004), or points on the n-dimensional13
hypersphere.914
In the ‘quantum-amplitude’ approach, we consider the full potential of complex-valued belief15
8This is in contrast with the Hamiltonian model in which the value functions are implemented in the Hamiltonian
components which drive the decision process by progressing the belief state over time and which thus only indirectly
produce the choice probabilities.
9These belief-state vectors can then be expressed either using generalised spherical coordinates (e.g Lipovetsky
(2018); Blumenson (1960)):
ψ1 = cosφ1, ψ2 = sinφ1 cosφ2, ψ3 = sinφ1 sinφ2 cosφ3, . . .
ψn−1 = sinφ1 sinφ2 · · ·sinφn−1 cosφn, ψn = sinφ1 sinφ2 · · ·sinφn−1 sinφn
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amplitudes to directly estimate the choice probabilities. Thus, rather than evolving an initial state1
to a final belief-state vector, in this model we specifically optimise the proper complex amplitudes2
of the final belief state itself.3
For each individual, alternative i in a given choice task has an amplitude, ψi, which is estimated4










where ∆i j is the subjective difference between alternatives i and j (see Section 3.4 for details on the6
four different value functions that we test to represent this subjective difference) and δi is a constant7
for alternative i which implements the mean impact in the sample of any factors omitted from the8
specification of the value function for that alternative. This can cover both omitted attributes as well9
as underlying preferences for specific alternatives. These constants will only take a value of zero10
if, in the situation of all included explanatory variables taking the same value for the alternatives,11
the probabilities will be equal. Both ∆i j and δi depend on the individual respondent and the task at12
hand. The normalisation factor (which ensures Equation 2 holds),
√
N , is obtained from the sum13






















Whereas adding the same constant to the utility of every alternative does not have an impact in15
random utility models, the multiplication of the amplitudes by the same constant does not impact16
the choice probabilities of alternatives under a quantum system (see Equation 2). Consequently,17
we can have J parameters to capture the underlying preference towards the J alternatives. The18
greater the magnitude of these constants, δi, relative to the magnitude of the differences, ∆i j,19
the less deterministic the choices become. Note that from a mathematical point of view we can20
equivalently estimate the corresponding probabilities, instead of the amplitudes Equation (3), in21
the model parameter optimisation process (Section 5). Finally, we note that the amplitude model is22
more general than the cosine similarity model in that it also allows for complex-valued functional23
expressions, ∆i j, of subjective attribute differences of the alternatives (see section 5.2).24
3.2. The quantum-Hamiltonian model25
In the search for an adequate dynamical approach to the decision process, quantum dynamical el-26
ements have proven effective in covering experimental choice paradigms involving ordering and27
contextuality (Aerts et al., 1999; Busemeyer et al., 2006; Atmanspacher and Filk, 2010; Fuss and28
Navarro, 2013; Martínez-Martínez, 2014; Asano et al., 2015; Kvam et al., 2015; Broekaert et al.,29
2017, 2020; Bagarello, 2019). An introductory treatment of this quantum dynamical approach in30
decision making can be found in Busemeyer and Bruza (2012)’s handbook. At the core of this31
or by using similarity angles (Pothos et al., 2013) as given by (see Figure 2);
ψ1 = cosθ1, . . . , ψi = cosθi, . . . , ψn = cosθn
in which the similarity cosines must satisfy state normalisation ∑
n
i=1 cos
2 θi = 1.
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approach is the operator which drives the change of a state vector in quantum theory; the Hamilto-1
nian.10 In contrast to the quantum-amplitude model (see Section 3.1), the ‘quantum-Hamiltonian’2
model thus implements the behavioural decision process as an evolution of the belief state over3
time. In this dynamical choice model the stochastic process underlying the change of a partic-4
ipant’s belief state over time will now be driven through a Hamiltonian which implements the5
comparison of the attributes of the alternatives. More specifically, the Hamiltonian operator H6
controls the change of the state vector according to the dynamics of the Schrödinger equation:7
−i d
dt
Ψ = HΨ, (5)
where we have assumed dimensionless expressions for time and ‘energy’.11 The only formal8
requirement on the Hamiltonian is Hermiticity, H† = H, i.e. the transpose conjugate of matrix H9
returns H itself. This property assures that the time evolution will conserve the normalisation of10
the belief state at all times and thus ensure that the choice probabilities across the alternatives add11
up to 1.12
The driving factors of the decision task are formally integrated in the Hamiltonian according13









where ⋆ indicates the complex conjugate. It should be remarked however that factors in the off-15
diagonal elements of the Hamiltonian serve a different dynamical function than in the amplitude16
model (Equation 3). In the Hamiltonian model, the drivers embody pairwise symmetric compar-17
isons of attributes of two alternatives which dynamically compete with each other. For more than18
two alternatives, we can estimate additional diagonal elements, h j j and each pairwise comparison19
of alternatives is implemented in a separate parallel process by allocating the drivers to the proper20
matrix positions;1221
hi j = δi j +∆i j. (i 6= j) (7)
In the amplitude model, on the other hand, all pairwise attribute comparisons are immediately22
summed into the resulting probability amplitude. The driving factors, {δ ,∆}, therefore serve a23
very different modelling purpose in the two quantum approaches.24
The changed belief state at each moment of time is the solution of the Schrödinger equation25
(see equation 5). This solution can be easily expressed by calculating the propagator:26
U(t) = e−iHt , (8)
10A formally very similar dynamic model is provided by continuous-time Markov chain theory in which the operator
of change is the transition rate matrix or ‘intensity’ matrix (see e.g. Busemeyer and Bruza 2012).
11In quantum-like modelling in decision making, Planck’s constant is set equal to 1 as a standard. This essentially
introduces a scale factor to ‘time’ in the decision process. The Hamiltonian is the generator of change over time but is
further devoid of energy connotation.
12The Hamiltonian model can be extended to encompass non-symmetric comparison of attributes by doubling the
dimension of the Hilbert space. The belief state for each alternative then consists of a two-dimensional subspace.
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and applying it to the initial belief state:1
Ψ(t) =U(t)Ψ(0). (9)
In the Hamiltonian model, the unitary time-propagator thus evolves the uninformed - and in gen-2
















Like in the general quantum-like approach, to obtain the choice probability for a particular alter-4
native in the experimental paradigm, the corresponding subspace projector M j should be applied5
and its outcome norm-squared; ||M jΨ(t)||2. One more crucial formal element in the Hamiltonian6
formalism for a decision process is thus the time of measurement. Since the datasets we cover in7
our present study do not include reaction times, we can fix this time to π/2 in accordance with8
standard time-scaling procedures (Busemeyer and Bruza, 2012).139
3.3. Quantum rotations10
In Section 2.1 and Figure 3, we demonstrated how a ‘change of perspective’ could be accomplished11
by a projection onto a system with rotated axes representing the new context of the decision. In12
an equivalent active implementation, this change of perspective can be incurred by applying a13
rotation operation on the belief state itself (whereas a passive implementation would rotate the basis14
vectors). For the simplest example with two alternatives, this rotation occurs in a 2-dimensional15
Hilbert space. The quantum generators of such rotations are the Pauli matrices, e.g. (Feynman16

















The rotation operator, R, itself - about axis n = (nx,ny,nz) and over angle ϑ - is then given by;
1418
R = e−iϑn·σ , (12)
where n ·σ gives some combination of the Pauli factors, with the restriction that |n| = 1. These19
rotation operations will be applicable in two of the covered experimental paradigms in our present20
study (see Section 5).21
3.4. Value functions: linear difference, asymmetric decay, soft plus22
As well as the use of different ‘error structures’ provided by the different models, we can also23
improve our models through the use of non-linear value functions to translate objective differences24
13Note that a more elaborate quantum model, with intermediate and iterated response/no-response reductions, is
required to handle response times (Busemeyer et al., 2006; Kempe, 2003)
14Using the equivalence
e−iϑn·σ = 1 cosϑ − in ·σ sinϑ ,
it is easily verified that for ny = 1, one retrieves the classical expression for a rotation matrix in the real plane, e.g.
(Busemeyer and Bruza, 2012; Broekaert et al., 2017).
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into subjective ones. In this paper, we test four different value functions across our logit and1
quantum-like models.2
Linear Difference function (LD). The first value function we use simply calculates the relative3
importance of the linear differences in attributes. Thus, for respondent n in choice task t, we define4





βk · (xik − x jk), (LD) (13)
where k = 1, ...,K is an index across attributes, βk a coefficient for the relative importance of6
attribute k and xik and x jk are the values for alternatives i and j for attribute k.7
Asymmetric Decaying Linear Difference function (ADLD). The second value function we8
test is based on the use of drift rate functions from the multi-attribute linear ballistic accumulator9
model (Trueblood et al., 2014a). The linear ballistic accumulator (LBA), was originally designed10
within mathematical psychology, and is a model designed to capture both choices and response11
times (Brown and Heathcote, 2008). In this approach, a decision-maker starts with a random12
amount of evidence for each alternative. The evidence for each alternative then grows linearly13
according to a set of drift rates (with one rate for each alternative). The first to reach some thresh-14
old is then the chosen alternative. This model was then adjusted for alternatives with multiple15
attributes (MLBA) and has been used successfully to explain choices between ratings for eyewit-16
ness testimony (Trueblood et al., 2014a), consumer and perceptual choices (Turner et al., 2018) and17
gambling and accommodation choices (Cohen et al., 2017). In the approach for multiple attributes,18
the drift rates are generated from a normal distribution where the mean drift rates are a function19
of the attributes of the alternatives. The non-linearity in the specification for the drift rates allows20
for the explanation of the similarity, attraction and compromise effects. Notably, work such as21
Guevara and Fukushi (2016) and Hancock et al. (2018) demonstrate that models that can account22
for these context effects can be effective for understanding travel behaviour. The corresponding23





wxi jk ·βk · (xik − x jk), (ADLD) (14)
where wxi jk is a similarity weighting and βk, xik and x jk are defined as before. Whilst similar in25
appearance to regret functions (see Equation 16), this function, rather than using a logarithm, uses26
similarity weightings. These are defined such that they are an exponentially decaying function of27
distance (dropping the indices for individual and task):28










xik < x jk
])
·βk · |xik − x jk|
)
, (15)
where the square brackets convert to 0 or 1 according to the conditional test whether attribute value29
k is larger in Alti than in Alt j, or vice versa. Under MLBA, two different values, λ1 and λ2, are30
used to capture Tversky (1977)’s findings that the subjective similarity between A and B and the31
subjective similarity between B and A may not be equal. Given that differences between losses and32
gains have regularly been shown to be important in a transport context (Hess et al., 2008; Masiero33
and Hensher, 2010; Stathopoulos and Hess, 2012), this is a useful feature for this quantum model34
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as well. Both λ values should be greater than zero to ensure that attributes that are more similar1
have a higher similarity value wxi jk . This results in weights that are between 0 and 1.
15 Whilst2
MLBA models typically use just a single pair of λ parameters, another option is to have pairs that3
are specific to each attribute (i.e. λ1k and λ2k), though this would of course lead to a large increase4
in the number of estimated parameters if there is a large number of attributes.5
Softplus function (S+). The third value function we test is derived from ‘softplus’ functions,6
which are used for the activation of a node depending on inputs in a neural network (Hahnloser7
et al., 2000) and are frequently implemented within machine learning (Dugas et al., 2001; Nair and8
Hinton, 2010; Zheng et al., 2015). This function is better known in choice modelling for their use9
within regret functions from random regret minimisation (RRM). The deterministic regret (Chorus,10





ln(1+ eβk(x jk−xik)), (S+) (16)
with βk, xik and x jk defined as before.12
µ-RRM function (µ-RRM). The final value function we use is based on µ-RRM (van Cra-13
nenburgh et al., 2015), which is designed to estimate the ‘profundity of regret’. It is defined as:14






µ (x jk−xik)), (µ −RRM) (17)
where µ is a parameter that results in the function collapsing to the LD function (Equation 13) if it15
is arbitrarily large, and to the S+ function (Equation 16) if it is close to a value of 1.16
The use of the four different value functions for ∆i j together with Equations (A1, A2), in the17
Appendix, of the Logit approach, thus correspond to a multinomial logit (MNL), a contextual18
utility model and random regret minimisation models (RRM, µ-RRM), respectively. We compare19
these base models against all of these value functions combined with quantum choice models in20
Section 5.1.21
4. DATA FOR EMPIRICAL EXAMPLES22
In this paper, we test our different specifications of quantum models on a number of travel be-23
haviour datasets, which we now describe in turn.24
4.1. Swiss value of time dataset25
The first dataset we use comes from the Swiss value of time study (Axhausen et al., 2008), where26
389 participants each make 9 binary route choice tasks. The two alternatives are described by travel27
cost (CHF), travel time (minutes), headway (minutes) and the number of interchanges required28
to complete the trip. This is a basic route choice dataset, without the possibility of testing for29
interference effects, i.e. an absence of conditions that are specifically suitable for quantum models.30
We include this ‘basic’ dataset to test how our quantum models perform under basic settings (i.e.31
when there is no need for a ‘quantum rotation’). This allows us to test whether the underlying32
structure for the quantum models is effective for modelling travel behaviour.33
15Note that we adjust the drift rate specification and the weighting functions from the standard specification in
Trueblood et al. (2014a) to include weights (βk) for the relative importance of different attributes.
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4.2. UK value of time dataset1
The second dataset that we use in this paper comes from the most recent value of travel time study2
conducted in the UK (Batley et al., 2017). This dataset comprises of 15,045 choices between two3
balanced alternatives, one of which is cheaper and the other faster (SP1 in Batley et al. 2017). This4
second dataset allows us to consider quantum rotations to understand the impact of a change in the5
position of the alternatives or the attributes. In the lay-out of the UK value of time paradigm, two6
travel alternatives are juxtaposed and are ordered according to two variations;7
Time on top: 1) the shorter time but more expensive alternative on the left of the page and thus8
the longer time but cheaper alternative on the right ‘t/C-T/c’, and 2) the longer time alternative on9
the left of the page and thus the shorter time on the right ‘T/c-t/C’.10
Different respondents received the same alternatives and orders, but with inverted ordering of the11
textual formulation (‘phrasing’) of the time and cost of the alternative. With these adapted formu-12
lations of the options, the two alternatives were again presented in both relative positions.13
Cost on top: 1) the configuration with shorter time alternative on the left ‘C/t-c/T’, and 2) the14
configuration with longer time alternative on the left ‘c/T-C/t’.15
The aggregated respondent preferences given in Table 1, show the option order variation16 to have16
a significant influence on choice.1717
TABLE 1 : Observed choice share for alternative 1 in UK-Context paradigm
Option Order 1 Option Order 2
Textual Order 1 0.495 0.474
Textual Order 2 0.517 0.473
Initial tests suggest that the option order shows a bias effect on the choices made by the respon-18
dents, with χ2(1,N = 15045) = 15.884, p = 6.735e− 5. However, we see that the textual order19
does not, with χ2(1,N = 15045) = 1.628, p = 0.280. These effects cannot however be disentan-20
gled from the impacts of changes in attributes levels in choice tasks, as whilst a balanced design21
is used to create the choice tasks, the attribute levels are based on a reference trip, meaning that22
contextual effects can only be disentangled through the estimation of models jointly incorporating23
the impact of all attributes.24
4.3. UK best-worst dataset25
The third dataset uses the best-worst format, allowing us to test quantum rotations for their ability26
to capture both best and worst choices simultaneously. The best-worst dataset we use comes from27
a survey asking public transport commuters living in the UK to make a set of ten choices between28
three route alternatives in a stated preference survey. Each choice task involves an invariant refer-29
ence trip and two hypothetical alternatives. In each instance, the first alternative corresponded to30
the current respondent-specific conditions. The attributes of the two other alternatives are pivoted31
around the attributes of the status quo alternative, where the design process ensured that none of32
16Note that Prob(Alt2) = 1 - Prob(Alt1) in Table 1.
17Notice that order effects in quantum-like modelling have been covered previously for consecutive execution of
tasks over time and in varied order of execution. In the current paradigm, the order effect relates to variations of visual
presentation and phrasing ordering all in the same instance of time.
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the three alternatives dominates. Each alternative is described by six attributes: travel time (in1
minutes), fare (£), rate of crowded trips, rate of delays (both out of 10 trips), the average length2
of delays (across delayed trips) and the provision of delay information service (which could be3
unavailable, available at a cost, or available for free). A total of 391 participants completed 104
choice tasks. The participant’s task consists of choosing the best option out of the three presented5
alternatives, and the worst option out of the two remaining alternatives. As participants choose a6
best and a worst alternative in each choice task, we have a total of 7,820 choices. For full details7
of the dataset, readers should refer to Stathopoulos and Hess (2012). Crucially, in this best-worst8
choice data, a bias can be observed in the respondent choice shares, which are given in Table 2,9
with respondents tending to choose alternatives 2 or 3 as their least favoured alternative more often10
than their current trip (alternative 1), χ2(2,N = 7820) = 899.9, p < 2.2e−16.11
TABLE 2 : Joint Choice Probabilities and marginals in UK-Best/Worst paradigm
Alternative 1 worst Alternative 2 worst Alternative 3 worst Sum
Alternative 1 best • 0.198 0.149 0.347
Alternative 2 best 0.098 • 0.251 0.349
Alternative 3 best 0.058 0.246 • 0.303
Sum 0.156 0.444 0.400 1
5. EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS12
In this section, we describe the various empirical exercises conducted on the data described in13
Section 4. We start with basic models, before increasing the complexity of the models. Finally,14
we consider out of sample validation for quantum rotations. For all models, we use R packages15
maxLik (Henningsen and Toomet, 2011) and Apollo (Hess and Palma, 2019) for estimation of the16
log-likelihood functions.17
5.1. Basic models: logit, DFT, q-Hamilton, q-amplitude.18
For the first test of our quantum models, we use all three datasets (Swiss, UK-Context and UK-19
Best/Worst). At this point, we do not yet consider quantum rotations, simply focussing on com-20
paring the different modelling approaches as well as testing the impact of using different value21
functions. Whilst these value functions can incorporate real and imaginary parts for the quantum22
choice models, we test real-only value functions in this section, with comparisons using imaginary23
parts in Section 5.2. For all three datasets, we compare the quantum models against multinomial24
logit (MNL), random regret minimisation (RRM), µ −RRM and a contextual utility model with25
ADLD value functions (from MLBA theory, as defined in Section 3.4). All of these models have26
the assumption of no error correlation across choices (thus all choices are treated as being inde-27
pendent from each other, with no correlation assumed between sequential choices), as at this point,28
we wish to test the impact of simply changing the value function or changing from a classical29
error structure (which assumes extreme value errors) to quantum choice models.18 We also test30
18We report robust standard errors throughout as the computation of the covariance matrix then also accounts for
the repeated choice nature of the data, which generally results in an upwards correction of standard errors (cf. Daly
and Hess (2010).
Hancock, Broekaert, Hess and Choudhury 19
our models against Decision Field Theory (DFT), which was demonstrated to outperform standard1
choice models in our previous research (Hancock et al., 2018). DFT is a dynamic stochastic choice2
model under which the preferences for different alternatives update over time within the context3
of a single choice. For a full description of the model, please refer to the Appendix. We first4
look at specific considerations for the best-worst data, before discussing model specification more5
generally, and then presenting the results.6
5.1.1. Best-worst data modelling methodology7
For the best-worst data, we at this point make the basic assumption that best is the opposite of8
worst. In a utility context, it is common practice to assume symmetry between best and worst,199
such that:10
U(Alti worst) =−U(Alti best). (18)
For quantum models, however, this translation is not as simple for amplitudes. This is a conse-11
quence of using the squared amplitudes to calculate the probability of choice of alternatives (see12
Equation 1), when negative amplitudes for each projection will result in the same probabilities for13
each alternative as the corresponding positive projections. In the case of only three alternatives (a14
regular setting for many surveys), there however exists a simple transformation. Given that there15
are two alternatives left after choosing the most preferred, the probability of picking one alterna-16
tive as the second best (or second most preferred) equals the probability of picking the other as the17
worst. Consequently, given alternatives i and j, we can simply define the amplitudes for alternative18
i being the worst as:19
|ψworst i |= |ψbest j |, (basic inversion) (19)
which we define as a ‘basic inversion’ as it corresponds to the utility model in Equation 18, in that20
the factors that determine best and worst choice are identical.21
For all models, the decision process of the best-worst choice task can be analysed as a progres-22
sion of a single encompassing process in which valuations of the first stage of choosing the best23
alternative are carried over into the subsequent process of choosing the worst alternative. On the24
other hand, these two stages of choice making can be considered to occur independently of each25
other without carry-over of previous outcomes. Mathematically, this means that in a ‘continued26
deliberation’ approach, utilities or amplitudes are generated using the appropriate value function27
to estimate the probability of each alternative being chosen as the best. Equations 18 and 19 are28
then used to generate the probability for the worst alternative directly, without a new evaluation29
of utilities or amplitudes. In an ‘independent’ evaluation approach, the utilities and amplitudes30
are re-evaluated for worst choice, where attribute differences between the alternative chosen as the31
best and the remaining alternatives are not included (thus, for example, under the amplitude model,32
Equation 3 would no longer have a summation, simply requiring ∆i j where i and j are the only two33
remaining alternatives).34
5.1.2. General points on model specification35
For the models tested in this section, we have the following parameters:36
19This is an oversimplification, with recent work demonstrating that an alternative is to use a scaling parameter,
α , for the difference in scale between best and worst Hawkins et al. (2019). Alternatively, one can use a completely
separate set of parameters for best choice compared to worst choice (Giergiczny et al., 2017), a point to which we
return in Sections 5.3 and 5.4.
Hancock, Broekaert, Hess and Choudhury 20
• All models: A relative importance parameter (βk) for each attribute (4, 2 and 8 parameters1
respectively for the Swiss, UK value of time and UK best-worst datasets.20)2
• Utility models: J − 1 alternative specific constants (1, 1 and 2 parameters respectively for3
the Swiss, UK value of time and UK best-worst datasets).4
• DFT models: J−1 alternative specific constants (1, 1 and 2 parameters respectively for the5
Swiss, UK value of time and UK best-worst datasets). All DFT models have 1 additional6
estimated parameter for the number of preference updating steps, with the UK best-worst7
model additionally having two feedback matrix parameters, φ1 and φ2. These two parameters8
were found to be insignificant for the Swiss and UK value of time datasets (in line with9
previous results for datasets comprised of choices tasks with 2 alternatives, Hancock et al.10
2020) and were therefore omitted. Note that as we use attribute scaling coefficients in our11
DFT models (see Appendix), we fix the error σε = 1 for normalisation purposes.12
• Hamiltonian models: 1 alternative pair constant for the Swiss and UK value of time datasets13
and 3 for the UK best-worst dataset. We also have J −1 Hamiltonian matrix diagonals (1, 114
and 2 parameters respectively for the Swiss, UK value of time and UK best-worst datasets).15
Finally, the Hamiltonian models for UK best-worst models incorporating ‘independent de-16
liberations’ has different Hamiltonian matrices for best and worst choice. For best choice, a17
3x3 matrix is required, thus 2 parameters are required, whilst for worst choice, we require a18
2x2 matrix, meaning that 1 additional parameter is required.19
• Amplitude models: J alternative specific constants (2, 2 and 3 parameters respectively for20
the Swiss, UK value of time and UK best-worst datasets).21
• ADLD value function: 2 additional parameters for the utility model, λ1 and λ2. For the22
Hamiltonian model, we only estimate a single λ as we set λ1 = λ2 such that ∆i j = ∆ ji and23
the Hamiltonian matrix remains Hermitian. DFT similarly requires ∆i j = ∆ ji, thus only has24
one λ estimated (See explanation of this in the Appendix). For the amplitude models, we25
fix one λ parameter to a value of 1, as dividing λ by some value x and multiplying the26
β parameters by x results in amplitudes that are also multiplied by x (hence normalisation27
results in exactly the same probabilities and an overspecification if we do not fix a λ ).28
• ADLDpA value function: Has a set of lambdas for each attribute (‘ADLD per Attr.’). This29
results in an insubstantial change in log-likelihood for the Swiss and UK best-worst datasets,30
thus we only show the results for the UK value of time dataset. As this dataset has two31
attributes, it has a total of 4 λ -parameters in the utility model, and 2 in the Hamiltonian and32
DFT models (with the same restrictions applied from above).33
• µ-RRM value function: 1 additional parameter, µ , which measures the profundity of regret.34
20Note that the UK best-worst dataset has choice alternatives with 6 attributes. The provision and cost of delay
information service are treated separately, and we also have a ‘reliability’ index, which is the expected delay, defined
as the interaction between the average time delay and the rate of delays, which was found to be significant in previous
research (Stathopoulos and Hess, 2012).
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5.1.3. Estimation results1
The results for all of the basic models21 are given in Table 3, with these results complemented by2
Figure 6.3
For the Swiss dataset, the best model fit is obtained by a quantum amplitude model with an4
ADLD value function. Notably, there is a high degree of non-linearity, with all ADLD functions5
resulting in a significant improvement over models with a linear difference value function. If only6
linear differences are considered, DFT results in the best model fit. Gains over the LD value7
function are also obtained through the use of S+ and µ-RRM value functions for the quantum8
amplitude model. Whilst the model results obtained from the quantum Hamiltonian models are9
similar to those of the utility models, DFT and quantum amplitude models both offer substantial10
improvements in model fit, for all value functions other than a quantum amplitude model with11
linear differences.12
Similar results are also obtained for the UK value of time data, with DFT again substantially13
outperforming all other models when linear differences are used. This suggests that a standard14
DFT model can account for non-linearity, as the difference disappears upon moving to ADLD15
value functions, for which very similar log-likelihoods are obtained across all four models. The16
quantum amplitude model again gives us the best model fit across the dataset, through the use17
of attribute-specific λ parameters in the ADLDpA value function.22 This addition results in the18
amplitude model substantially outperforming the other models. The µ-RRM model obtains an19
estimate for µ that is insignificantly different from 1 for the quantum amplitude model, resulting20
in an equivalent model fit to that of the S+ value function. We again observe no difference in model21
fit between RRM, µ-RRM and MNL as there are only two choice alternatives in all choice tasks.22
For the UK best-worst dataset, our quantum models do not perform as well. This is particularly23
the case for continued deliberation (when a single value is used to generate probabilities for best24
and worst choice), for which the best performing model is the ADLD utility model. Whilst DFT25
achieves similar model fit, neither Hamiltonian nor amplitude models perform as well as the utility26
models. Notably, very similar log-likelihoods are obtained for MNL, RRM and µ−RRM. We again27
observe that DFT models perform best for linear difference value functions, with a substantial28
difference observed for the UK best-worst independent deliberation models. This advantage is29
reduced through the use of ADLD value functions, though DFT models still give the best model30
fit.31
Crucially, across all three datasets, the best performing quantum amplitude model achieves a32
better model fit than the best utility model. In comparison to the quantum models, DFT performs33
similarly for the Swiss dataset, worse for the UK value of time dataset and better for the UK best-34
worst dataset. The only substantial difference in model fit in favour of the Hamiltonian model35
over the amplitude model occurs when linear differences are used for the independent deliberation36
models. This difference is reversed, however, through the use of ADLD value functions. In Table 4,37
we also give some parameter estimates for the ADLD models run on the Swiss data (model outputs38
for more complex specifications of these models are given in Tables 7 and 10 for the UK value of39
time and UK best worst datasets, respectively). Whilst the outputs from quantum and DFT models40
21Note that we do not report BIC values here, as for the Swiss dataset, the best-fitting version of each model has
the same number of parameters, and for the UK datasets, we provide more complex versions of the models in later
subsections.
22Note that ADLDpA value functions were tested on both the Swiss and UK best-worst datasets but did not result




























Decision Field Quantum Quantum
Theory Hamiltonian Amplitude
Dataset Value function pars. LL pars. LL pars. LL pars. LL
Swiss
LD 5 -1,667.97 6 -1,575.40 6 -1,666.92 6 -1,682.83
ADLD 7 -1,631.46 7 -1,570.56 7 -1,638.96 7 -1,569.05
S+ 5 -1,667.97 6 -1,587.00
µ-RRM 6 -1,667.97 7 -1,576.56
UK value of time
LD 3 -9,603.17 4 -9,390.42 4 -9,412.23 4 -9,524.21
ADLD 5 -9,306.86 5 -9,309.98 5 -9,310.32 5 -9,313.73
ADLDpA 7 -8,936.61 6 -8,982.05 6 -9,026.91 7 -8,790.80
S+ 3 -9,603.17 4 -9,369.61
µ-RRM 4 -9,603.17 5 -9,369.61
LD 10 -5,802.67 13 -5,788.36 13 -5,831.05 11 -5,850.54
UK best-worst ADLD 12 -5,777.57 14 -5,780.56 14 -5,818.60 12 -5,802.22
[continued deliberation] S+ 10 -5,803.97 11 -5,812.90
µ-RRM 11 -5,802.25 12 -5,812.90
LD 10 -5,780.34 13 -5,656.16 14 -5,818.74 11 -5,868.75
UK best-worst ADLD 12 -5,668.36 14 -5,648.68 15 -5,818.74 12 -5,660.84
[independent deliberation] S+ 10 -5,815.69 11 -5,683.49
























FIGURE 6 : The log-likelihoods of the basic models across the three datasets
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cannot be translated into measures such as the value of travel time, we can obtain an indication for1
the relative importance (RI) of the different attributes by dividing the parameter estimates by the2








where k = 1, ...,K is an index across attributes. All models find significant estimates with the5
expected sign for all four attributes, and no significant bias between alternatives 1 and 2. The6
quantum amplitude model gives similar relative importance weights to the utility model, whereas7
the DFT and Hamiltonian models give less importance to cost, instead giving a higher weight to8
the number of changes (βCH). The quantum amplitude model has a better fit than the Hamiltonian9
model, however, suggesting that differences in attribute importance across the models may not be10
the driving force behind the differences in model fit.11
Additionally, all models find significant estimates for λ1, which is unsurprising given that all12
models with ADLD value functions offer a significant improvement in model fit over the corre-13
sponding LD value function models. The non-linearity captured by the models utilising ADLD14
functions is demonstrated for differences in travel time between alternatives in Figure 7. In this15
figure, the y-axis shows the ‘relative contribution’ to ∆i j, which is defined as Equation 14 but with-16
out the multiplication by βk (thus it is equivalent to wxi jk · (xik − x jk)), which allows us to compare17
the impact of the non-linearity across the models. These results suggest that the quantum models18
find a stronger damping effect, resulting in greater differences having less of an impact in these19
models relative to their impact in the DFT and logit models, which have nearly identical satiation20
rates.21
FIGURE 7 : The non-linearity for time differences in the Swiss models
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TABLE 4 : Parameter estimates from the models for the Swiss dataset with ADLD value functions,
with rel. weight giving the relative importance of the different attributes
Utility DFT q-Hamiltonian q-Amplitude
Parameters 7 7 7 7
Log-likelihood -1,631.46 -1,570.56 -1,638.96 -1,569.05
βT T
est. -0.1231 -3.8682 -0.0300 -0.4071
rob. t-rat. -5.00 -9.35 -9.55 -3.82
rel. weight 8.3% 5.8% 6.3% 6.8%
βCOST
est. -0.3575 -12.7524 -0.0883 -1.3585
rob. t-rat. -4.17 -6.55 -5.82 -3.23
rel. weight 24.1% 19.1% 18.5% 22.6%
βHW
est. -0.0257 -1.2633 -0.0100 -0.1051
rob. t-rat. -7.68 -5.77 -14.54 -4.23
rel. weight 1.7% 1.9% 2.1% 1.7%
βCH
est. -0.9773 -48.9351 -0.3496 -4.1473
rob. t-rat. -5.94 -6.49 -15.04 -4.42
rel. weight 65.9% 73.2% 73.2% 68.9%
λ1
est. 0.7560 0.0027 0.4300 0.0325
rob. t-rat. 2.29 3.07 7.81 4.35
λ2
est. 0.0859 1.0000
rob. t-rat. 0.79 fixed
δ1
est. -0.0150 -1.1200 0.6400
rob. t-rat. -0.37 -0.37 2.06
δ2
est. 0.0000 0.0000 0.6500









rob. t-rat. (vs. 1) 5.96
h11
est. 0.9051
rob. t-rat. (vs. 1) 2.37
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5.2. Extension to complex value-functions1
Proper to a quantum-like approaches, the value functions (see Section 3.4), which build up the2
amplitudes, Equation (3) and drive the Hamiltonians, Equation (7), need not to be restricted to real-3
valued expressions. This increased flexibility allows for interactions between different components4
within an evaluation of an alternative.5
5.2.1. Specification6
Whilst there are many different possibilities for how to construct real and imaginary parts within a7
value function, in this section we consider only simple specifications where the alternative specific8
constants (δ ) and attribute comparisons (∆) are either real or imaginary. For imaginary parts,9
we simply multiply the corresponding component by i. Thus, for example, in the Hamiltonian10
model, Equation 7 becomes hi j = δi j + i ·∆i j, for a model with real alternative specific constants11
and imaginary valued attribute differences. This gives us four alternative specifications for the12
Hamiltonian models. For the amplitude model, the equivalent model with real alternative specific13
constants and imaginary valued attribute differences is (for the UK value of time dataset):14
ψ1 = (δ1 + i ·wtc12 · tc12 + i ·wtt12 · tt12)/
√
N (21)
ψ2 = (δ2 + i ·wtc21 · (−tc12)+ i ·wtt21 · (−tt12))/
√
N (22)
with tc12 the difference in travel cost between alternatives 1 and 2, tt12 the difference in travel15
times between alternatives 1 and 2, multiplied by their similarity weightings (which are defined in16
Equation 15). Finally, we have:17
N = |δ1 + i ·wtc12 · tc12 + i ·wtt12 · tt12|2 + |δ2 + i ·wtc21 · (−tc12)+ i ·wtt21 · (−tt12)|2 , (23)
which ensures that the sum over the probabilities of each alternative equals 1. We only have two18
different real-imaginary combinations for the amplitude models, as a result of the use of the norm19
in Equations (4) and (23), implying
∣
∣































. For the Hamiltonian models, each of the four real-imaginary21
combinations leads to a different dynamical evolution as a result of Equation (8).22
5.2.2. Results23
The results of each of these specifications is given in Table 5 for the ADLD value function model24
for each dataset.25
For the Hamiltonian models, the addition of imaginary differences (Im-∆) has a negative impact26
for the Swiss and UK value of time datasets, resulting in a far inferior model fit. The alternative27
specific constants (which are not significant for the Swiss dataset, see Table 4) have little effect on28
the model, with the consequence that there is little impact on model fit by changing from real to29
imaginary alternative specific constants. For the UK best-worst dataset, we observe far superior30
model fits through the use of imaginary attribute differences, with the improvement for the inde-31
pendent deliberation model resulting in the Hamiltonian model becoming more similar in model32
fit in comparison to the quantum amplitude, utility and DFT model results for the same data. For33
the amplitude models, we observe a better model fit in all cases for real-real/imaginary-imaginary34
combinations. Overall, these results suggest that there is ample scope for future exploration of35
alternative specifications of real and imaginary parts within quantum choice models.36
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TABLE 5 : Results from models incorporating real and imaginary parts for both q-Hamiltonian
and q-Amplitude models
Re-δ Re-∆ Re-δ Im-∆ Im-δ Re-∆ Im-δ Im-∆
q-Hamiltonian q-Hamiltonian q-Hamiltonian q-Hamiltonian
Swiss 7 -1,638.96 7 -1,785.75 7 -1,638.88 7 -1,785.89
UK value of time 6 -9,026.91 6 -9,395.86 6 -9,028.27 6 -9,394.86
UK best-worst [continued] 14 -5,818.60 14 -5,792.70 14 -5,814.29 14 -5,811.96
UK best-worst [independent] 15 -5,818.74 15 -5,684.40 15 -5,762.21 15 -5,810.28
q-Amplitude q-Amplitude q-Amplitude q-Amplitude
Swiss 7 -1,569.05 7 -1,569.56 7 -1,569.56 7 -1,569.05
UK value of time 7 -8,790.80 7 -8,967.92 7 -8,967.92 7 -8,790.80
UK best-worst [continued] 12 -5,802.22 12 -5,834.97 12 -5,834.97 12 -5,802.22
UK best-worst [independent] 12 -5,660.84 12 -5,673.93 12 -5,673.93 12 -5,660.84
5.3. Models with quantum rotation: contextual and ordering effects in the UK value of time1
dataset2
Thus far, we have only implemented quantum choice models without the use of quantum rotations.3
In Section 3.3, we demonstrate how ‘a change of perspective’ in a decision task can be represented4
within a quantum choice model by performing a quantum rotation on the belief state. In this5
section, we give the results of models incorporating rotations for contextual and ordering effects in6
the UK value of time dataset.7
This theoretically works well for the UK value of time dataset, which has some choice sets8
with the cheaper alternative shown first, and some with the faster alternative shown first, as well9
as having cost sometimes on top and sometimes at the bottom. Whilst we could again use a full10
set of different parameters for the four different scenarios, these ordering effects have previously11
been found to be significant (Hess et al., 2017), making this an appropriate dataset to test quantum12
rotations.13
5.3.1. Model specification14
Contextual effects such as described above can be captured in both our amplitude and Hamiltonian15
quantum models through a supplementary rotation for a switched option order and/or switched16
textual representation. The sizes of the two rotation angles give an immediate process-based as-17
sessment of the location order bias and the textual phrasing bias.18
In the Hamiltonian model, there is a Hamiltonian operator for the basic change in belief state19
due to the different values of the attributes of the two alternatives, and additionally an effect from20
a supplementary rotation for switched option order and for switched textual representation. The21
order effect is implemented by a rotation of the belief state Ψ= (ψ1,ψ2) in the Hilbert space where22
the first component ψ1 represents the belief amplitude for alternative 1 and the second amplitude23
ψ2 sustains the choice for alternative 2. Thus, for the reference configuration, ‘option order’ (Op-24
tOrd=1) and ‘time-cost order’ (TCOrd=1), we have a basic Hamiltonian (H11) set up as before,25
based on Equation 6. This is again a basic parametrised Hadamard gate, that is commonly used to26
implement the dynamics in a binary choice (Busemeyer et al., 2011). When the time-cost order re-27
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mains as in the reference configuration (TCOrd=1) while the option order is switched (OptOrd=2),1
the basic Hamiltonian is complemented with a small rotation over an angle ϑLR to implement the2
bias for option ordering. When on the other hand, only the time-cost order is changed with respect3
to the reference configuration and the option order remains unchanged (TCOrd=2, OptOrd=1),4
the basic Hamiltonian is again complemented with a rotation but with different angle size ϑPhr.5
When both time-cost order and the option order are changed with respect to the reference configu-6
ration, (OptOrd=2, TCOrd=2), the basic Hamiltonian is now complemented with the effect of both7









H12 = H11 +ϑLR σy (25)
H21 = H11 +ϑPhr σy (26)
H22 = H11 +(ϑLR +ϑPhr)σy. (27)
Note that this is equivalent to adjusting the off-diagonals of H11, with, for example, the upper and9
lower off-diagonals of H12 being δ12 +∆12 − i ϑLR and δ ⋆12 +∆⋆12 − i ϑLR, respectively. Conse-10
quently, for this implementation of the Hamiltonian model, the process of attribute comparison11
and ordering bias occurs simultaneously (addition on Hamiltonian level). The choice process12
could also be modelled sequentially by separating the Hamiltonian evolution operator, Equation13
(8), from the rotation operator, Equation (12), and applying them consecutively to the initial belief14
state. This method can also be used for the amplitude-approach, under which the attribute values of15
the two alternatives initially determine the basic reference probability amplitude, while dedicated16
rotations implement the bias process for switched option order and for switched textual represen-17
tation. Thus, in principle, we implement the same respective rotation operators (based on Equation18
12), for time-cost ordering and option ordering;19
RPhr = e
−iϑPhr σy , (28)
RLR = e
−iϑLR σy (29)
in both the amplitude model and Hamiltonian model.20
We compare different levels of complexity for each of the different model structures. We21
test three variations for contextual ‘changes in perspective’ for both the Hamiltonian and ampli-22
tude models as well as trying ‘separate’ parameter models where a set of attributes (based on the23
ADLDpA basic models) are estimated for each of the four contextual framings. Thus, we have the24
following five specifications:25
1. A basic model. These models correspond to those given by the ADLDpA models in Table 3.26
2. A model where a shift is made to ∆12, such that the constant δLR is added if (OptOrd=2) and27
the constant δPhr is added if (TCOrd=2). For the Hamiltonian model, this corresponds to28
Equations (24-27) with the use of σx in place of σy.29
3. A model where an imaginary valued shift is made to ∆12, such that i · δLR is added if (Op-30
tOrd=2) and i ·δPhr is added if (TCOrd=2). For the Hamiltonian model, this corresponds to31
Equations (24-27). The use of imaginary numbers here means that this version cannot be32
implemented in the utility and DFT models.33
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4. A model with the application of a quantum rotation of RPhr as defined by Equation 28 if1
(TCOrd=2), and a rotation of RLR (see Equation 29) if (OptOrd=2). This results in the2
estimation of two additional parameters, ϑPhr and ϑLR.3
5. A ‘separate’ model, in which the basic models are applied separately to subsets of the data4
corresponding to each contextual scenario. As we have four different scenarios, this results5
in a fourfold increase in the number of parameters for each model.6
5.3.2. Results7
The results of all possible specifications are given for each of the four model frameworks in Table8
6.9
TABLE 6 : Log-likelihood and BIC performance of Logit, DFT, Hamiltonian and Amplitude mod-
els for the UK-context paradigm, with models 2-5 also giving the improvement in log-likelihood
over model 1.
Logit DFT q-Hamiltonian q-Amplitude
[1] Basic model
pars. 7 6 6 7
LL -8,936.61 -8,982.05 -9,026.91 -8,790.80
BIC 17,941 18,022 18,112 17,649
[2] Context shifts added to ∆12
pars. 9 8 8 9
LL -8,927.59 -8,976.53 -9,018.09 -8,783.64
LL improvement 9.01 5.52 8.82 7.16
BIC 17,942 18,030 18,113 17,654
[3] (Im) Context shifts added to ∆12
pars. 8 9
LL -9,016.93 -8,789.96
LL improvement 9.97 0.84
BIC 18,111 17,666
[4] Rotation operators, RPhr and RLR
pars. 8 9
LL -9,017.76 -8,779.71
LL improvement 9.14 11.09
BIC 18,112 17,646
[5] Separate pars.
pars. 28 24 24 28
LL -8,909.48 -8,959.43 -8,990.00 -8,769.81
LL improvement 27.12 22.62 36.91 20.99
BIC 18,088 18,150 18,211 17,809
For all specifications, the amplitude model outperforms the utility model, which in turn has a10
better model fit than DFT and the Hamiltonian models. For all model frameworks, it appears that11
using separate sets of parameters instead of a basic model results in an improvement in model12
fit but a worse BIC. Whilst the quantum rotation models are not as successful as capturing the13
difference between the contextual situations as models with separate parameters, these models14
return favourable BICs as they only have two additional parameters. Notably, the best performing15
Hamiltonian model (in terms of BIC) implements an imaginary shift, as defined by Equations16
(24-27), and the model with the overall best BIC value is obtained with an amplitude model with17
rotation operators. The key parameter outputs for these models are given in Table 7.18
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TABLE 7 : Key model outputs from the context models with shifts or rotations for a change in
context
Model Version
Gain in Rel. importance of time δLR/ϑLR δPhr/ϑPhr
Log-likelihood (£/hour) Estimate Rob. t-rat. Estimate Rob. t-rat.
Utility 2 9.01 6.49 -0.1467 -3.81 0.0464 1.45
DFT 2 5.52 3.58 -0.3133 -2.99 0.0957 1.13
q-Hamiltonian
2 8.82 3.63 -0.0479 -3.88 0.0042 0.41
3 9.97 3.65 -0.0995 -3.61 0.1022 3.02
4 9.14 3.63 -0.0419 -3.85 0.0083 0.92
q-Amplitude
2 7.16 5.26 -10.3154 -3.52 2.3966 0.97
3 0.84 5.26 -38.6215 -0.69 59.7161 0.71
4 11.09 5.25 -0.0342 -4.29 0.0147 2.09
Crucially, all but one model show a negative estimate for δLR/ϑLR, which means that the probability1
of alternative 2 increases when we move from option order 1 to option order 2. This result is in line2
with the original test and confirms the presence of a shift in left-right bias as a result of changing3
whether the cheaper and slow alternative appears on the left or the right. For most of the models,4
we also confirm that there is no effect of changing the order of appearance for the attributes. Table5
6 also gives the ‘relative importance of travel time with respect to travel cost’, which is defined as6
the ratio of the time parameter estimate divided by the cost parameter estimate, multiplied by 607
(see further detail in Hancock et al. (2018) on how this measure can be interpreted). Whilst this8
does not correspond to welfare measures (as all models use asymmetric decay functions), these9
values give us an indication as to whether a decision-maker will more likely choose a fast or cheap10
alternative. In comparison to the utility model, both DFT and quantum models assign a lower11
importance to travel time.12
By considering the parameter outputs for version 4 (quantum rotation) models, we can also13
calculate the estimated rotation matrices RPhr and RLR. For the Hamiltonian (Ham) and amplitude14
(Amp) models, the rotation matrices for changing from having the cheaper alternative on the left15












and the estimates for the quantum rotation matrices for changing from having the travel time first17












This results in a shift towards alternative two through the use of RLR and a small shift towards19
alternative one through the use of RPhr.20
5.4. Contextual and ordering effects in the UK best-worst data21
The best-worst dataset also presents a suitable paradigm for the implementation of a quantum22
rotation, as it is possible that the influence of individual attributes may differ between the case23
of choosing the best alternative and the case of choosing the worst alternative (Giergiczny et al.,24
2017).25
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5.4.1. Model specification1
In the quantum-like approach, this changed perspective can be obtained by modifying the an-2
gle over which the basis vectors representing the choice of the worst alternative, |Alti worst〉,3
|Alt j worst
〉
, are rotated with respect to |Alti best〉, |Alt j best
〉
. This rotation changes the norm of4
the projected amplitudes (see Figure 3) and thus modifies the probability for choosing the worst5
alternative, see Equation (1). Formally, the belief state for choosing the worst alternative, Ψworst , is6
obtained by applying the rotation matrix R, Equation (12), to the residual belief state after having7
chosen the best alternative:8
Ψworst = RΨResid. best , (Best−Worst rotation) (32)
where ΨResid. best is a renormalised vector of the belief state Ψbest over the remaining choice alter-9
natives. One can easily verify that a rotation over an angle π/2 according to the axis of rotation10
ny = 1 results in the ‘basic inversion’ condition, Equation (19). Mathematically, this rotation si-11
multaneously causes a change in both underlying preferences towards alternatives and a change in12
how deterministic the choice is. In our empirical application, we test the basic inversion, Equation13
(19), and the more general quantum rotation, Equation (32). Naturally, if there is a mere classical14
inversion of amplitudes, the parameters will tend towards those that generate Equation (19).15
Under both the Hamiltonian and amplitude models, we assume a three dimensional complex16
Hilbert space for the belief states, Ψ = (ψ1,ψ2,ψ3), in which the respective components constitute17
the support for the respective alternatives. In the Hamiltonian approach, the decision process for18









which can be configured as unbiased |α|= |β |= |γ|= 1/
√
3. A relative phase can be implemented20
on the amplitudes to differentiate their engagement with the unitary evolution operator, Equation21
(8), or a non-process bias with respect to specific alternatives by setting |α| 6= |β | 6= |γ|. The initial22











The expression of the Hamiltonian can be considered as the superposition of three parametrised24
Hadamard gates which respectively implement the pairwise comparison process of attributes of the25
alternatives, Equation (7).26
In the amplitude model, the summed attribute differences are implemented directly into the27
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where N renders the belief state normalized to 1, similarly to Equation (23). The relative phase1
φbw between the bias component δ j and the attribute differences (∆ ji +∆ jk) implements a differ-2
ence in processing for both factors.3
In both of the quantum models that we implement, we also explore the inclusion of a ‘propor-4
tion’ parameter for the possibility that a respondent would reverse the processing order of choos-5
ing the best and worst alternatives. The UK-best/worst survey allows the respondent to either first6
choose the best alternative and then follow this by selecting the worst between the two remaining7
alternatives, or vice versa, starting with choosing the worst alternative before then choosing the8
best out of the remaining two alternatives. The proportion parameter expresses the proportion of9
choice processes that are taken in reverse order, by weighting the theoretical choice probabilities10
from models for both orders (‘best then worst’ and ‘worst then best’). Whilst there are many pos-11
sibilities for specifications for models that implement a ‘proportion’ parameter, we only test the12
most basic specification in our empirical application, under which there are no other additional pa-13
rameters. Thus if a decision-maker considers worst and then best, Ψworst is generated using −δi j14
and −∆i j in place of δi j and ∆i j in the Hamiltonian model. For the amplitude model, ∆i j 6= ∆ ji,15
thus we use −δi and ∆ ji in place of δi and ∆i j. Then, we generate a rotation matrix R that translates16
best to worst, and use R−1 for the translation from worst to best.17
In this application, we explore basic models for both ‘independent’ and ‘continued’ delibera-18
tion assumptions. Given the various extensions to these models discussed above, we consider four19
further possibilities. This gives us a total of six different specifications for the quantum choice20
models (and three for the utility and DFT models, which do not implement quantum rotations).21
These six possibilities are:22
1. A basic structure for each model based on independent deliberations, meaning that best and23
worst choice probabilities are calculated independently with worst choice using only the two24
unchosen alternatives within the value functions (thus not using the attribute values from the25
alternative chosen as best). In the first implementation of independent deliberations, we use26
the same set of estimated parameters for best and worst choice. To estimate the probability27
for worst choice, we simply calculate the probability of the other alternative being chosen28
as (second) best. The utility, DFT and amplitude models here correspond to the indepen-29
dent deliberation ADLD models given in Table 3. For the Hamiltonian model, we instead30
implement imaginary attribute differences,23 which corresponds to the best performing (in-31
dependent deliberation) Hamiltonian model from Table 5.32
2. The second method again uses the assumption of independent deliberations, but now allows33
for a completely ‘separate’ set of parameters for the best choices compared to the worst.34
This is equivalent to running two separate models where the dataset is split into two subsets:35
one with only the best alternative choice tasks and one with only the worst alternative choice36
tasks. Note that whilst this effectively doubles the number of estimated parameters, two37
DFT parameters are dropped as there is no significant impact of including feedback matrix38
parameters for the worst choice (as is often the case when choosing between two alternatives,39
see Appendix). Additionally, the Hamiltonian model estimates 2 diagonal elements for the40
Hamiltonian for best choice and 1 for the Hamiltonian for worst choice. Consequently, we41
do not need these 3 parameters twice for separate parameter models of best and worst choice.42
23Note that all Hamiltonian models in this section are implemented in this way.
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3. The third specification is based on the assumption of continued deliberation. This means1
that the probabilities for best and worst choice are generated simultaneously through the2
use of a single value function. We assume basic inversions for all models meaning that the3
same attributes are important for best and worst choice. These models correspond to the4
continued deliberation ADLD models given in Table 3, with the Hamiltonian model again5
using imaginary attribute differences, corresponding to the result in Table 5.6
4. The fourth model uses continued deliberations, but also allows for the application of a quan-7
tum rotation, R (see Equation 32, that is defined by Equation 12). To estimate R, we need to8
find the relative importance of the three Pauli matrices. In all cases, we find that the impact9
of including a third Pauli matrix is insignificant, and thus two additional parameters are esti-10
mated, ϑ and ω ,24 where R = e−iϑ(n1∗σ1+n2∗σ2), n1 = sin(ω), n2 = cos(ω) and n3 = 0. For11
the Hamiltonian models, nx = 0, and for the amplitude models, nz = 0. Note that just a sin-12
gle rotation matrix is used here, meaning that the model uses the same rotation to adjust the13
amplitudes for the two remaining alternatives, regardless of which pair is left. This results in14
the assumption that the same adjustment happens for (Alt1 → Alt2), (Alt1 → Alt3) and (Alt215
→ Alt3).16
5. The fifth model is equivalent to the fourth model, except that it also estimates a ‘proportion’17
parameter. This parameter estimates the percentage of decision-makers who ‘choose best18
then worst’ or ’worst then best’.19
6. The final model is equivalent to the fifth model, with the exception that two different rota-20
tion matrices are estimated through the use of two different axes specified by the parameter21
ω , one for the rotation from best to worst (ωbw), and the other for the rotation from worst22
to best (ωwb). Additionally, the Hamiltonian model no longer assumes an indifferent initial23






3), where s is an estimated param-24
eter. This results in two additional parameters for the Hamiltonian model and one for the25
amplitude model. The ‘worst to best’ rotation matrices are then set as Rwb = e
iϑ(nx∗σx+ny∗σy),26
where the weights nx and ny are estimated with ωwb. Consequently, Rwb = R
−1
bw if ωwb =ωbw.27
5.4.2. Results28
The results of these models are given in Table 8. Given the complex likelihood structure, we29
use an initial parameter search algorithm based on the heuristic for non-linear global optimisation30
developed by Bierlaire et al. (2010) in an attempt to reduce the risk of convergence to poor local31
optima. For all of the quantum models, we try the four different specifications using real and32
imaginary numbers, as tested in Table 5. For brevity, we show just the best-fitting model in each33
case, which is a model with Re-δi j and Im-∆i j for all of the models that incorporate quantum34
rotations.35
Unsurprisingly, every model finds a significant improvement in model fit by having a separate36
set of parameters for the best alternatives compared to the worst alternatives (in line with the results37
of Giergiczny et al. 2017). This suggests that the relative sensitivities to the different attributes for38
a best alternative are not necessarily the same as the relative sensitivities to the different attributes39
for a worst alternative. The overall best-fitting model in terms of log-likelihood is the DFT model40
with separate parameters. However, the quantum rotation models are efficient in parameter use and41
24The use of ω here within a sine and cosine function ensures that |n|= 1.
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TABLE 8 : Results from models for the best-worst dataset
Standard choice models Deliberation
Utility DFT
pars. LL BIC pars. LL BIC
[1] single set pars.
Independent
12 -5,668.36 11,444 14 -5,651.62 11,429
[2] separate pars. 24 -5,607.63 11,430 26 -5,569.04 11,371
[3] basic model Continued 12 -5,777.57 11,663 14 -5,780.56 11,687
Quantum choice models Deliberation
q-Hamiltonian q-Amplitude
pars. LL BIC pars. LL BIC
[1] single set pars.
Independent
15 -5,684.40 11,503 12 -5,660.84 11,429
[2] separate pars. 27 -5,657.22 11,556 24 -5,598.20 11,412
[3] basic model
Continued
14 -5,792.70 11,711 12 -5,802.22 11,712
[4] quantum rotation 1 16 -5,656.82 11,457 14 -5,742.78 11,611
[5] quantum rotation 2 17 -5,651.74 11,456 15 -5,612.08 11,359
[6] quantum rotation 3 19 -5,624.54 11,419 16 -5,611.09 11,366
consequently find good BIC values, with the result that the best BIC is obtained by an amplitude1
model that uses a quantum rotation. By stepping away from ‘best = opposite of worst’, the rotation2
models bring the performance of the continued deliberation models in line with those of the sepa-3
rate parameter independent deliberation models. Consequently, we find that best-worst choices in4
this dataset are ‘incompatible’: a quantum rotation is required to move from a set of basis vectors5
for best choices to a different set of basis vectors for worst choices. Overall, the results from both6
classical and quantum models suggest that best is not the opposite of worst, which is in line with7
the biases present in the overall choice shares (in Table 2).8
Test of the quantum rotations. Of key importance for the quantum models is to test the9
impact of the quantum rotation matrices themselves, as the inclusion of these matrices substantially10
improves both the Hamiltonian and amplitude models. We consider the impact of these matrices11
by looking at the resulting probabilities generated from the application of the matrix to an initial12
belief state. As a contrast to the rotation matrices generated by models for the UK value of time13
dataset, it is not intuitively clear what the impact of these rotation matrices are on complex-valued14
residual belief states, with the respective rotation matrices for the Hamiltonian (rotation 3 model)15




















We thus test these matrices by calculating their impact on the choice probabilities of each respon-18
dent of choosing an alternative as worst, given a belief state, ψResid.best , which corresponds to the19
Hancock, Broekaert, Hess and Choudhury 35
renormalised probability amplitudes for the remaining two alternatives following the choice of the1
best alternative. Vice versa, we check the choice probabilities for best alternative resulting from2
the application of the inverse rotation on ψResid.worst , the renormalised state for the remaining two3
alternatives following the choice of the worst alternative.4
This results in Figure 8, in which the amplitudes of the two remaining alternatives - after5
having chosen best (left panel) and worst (right panel) alternative - are rotated to generate the6
choice probabilities of the alternative being chosen as worst (left panel) or best (right panel) for7
each individual respondent. In this figure, the black dots show how the probability changes under8
a basic inversion (as described by Equation 19). Under a basic inversion, best is the opposite of9
worst, and as a direct consequence, a belief state of, for example ψResid.best = (1,0) generates10
probabilities for worst choice equal to 0 for the upper positioned alternative, and equal to 1 for the11
lower positioned alternative (hence swapping the amplitude entries).12
In both quantum models, we observe convex and concave transformations of second best (or13
second worst) choice probabilities into worst (or best) choice probabilities due to the rotation14
transformation. The impact of this rotation transformation is more easily assessed by checking the15
image for the value of the initial probability at 0.5, which corresponds to expressing indifference16
between the two remaining alternatives. In the case of a concave relation, the initial indifference17
results in the chosen second best (worst) alternative becoming the chosen worst (best) alternative18
with a higher probability. In contrast, in a convex relation, the probability of chosen second best19
(worst) alternative will render a lower probability for the chosen worst (best) alternative in com-20
parison to the basic inversion.25 We can now assess the impact of the quantum rotation in the21
observed bias effects when choosing the status quo, i.e. Alt1, as the worst alternative (see Table 2).22
Choosing the status quo as worst alternative occurs when either Alt2 or Alt3 are chosen as best al-23
ternatives, hence we must compare p(Alt3)(vs 1) for worst (blue) with p(Alt1)(vs 3) for worst (red)24
and, separately compare p(Alt2)(vs 1) for worst (purple) with p(Alt1)(vs 2) for worst (orange).25
When Alt2 is chosen as the best alternative, the amplitude model shows a substantial bias effect26
against the status quo as worst choice in the ‘best then worst’ order (blue concave, red convex).27
When Alt3 is chosen as the best alternative, the rotation produces the bias effect in both processing28
orders (purple concave and orange convex). This suggests that it is the introduction of the quantum29
rotation that drives the accurate recovery of the underlying observed choice shares given in Table30
2.31
Under the Hamiltonian model, the bias effect is not reproduced in exactly the same manner, in32
particular in the ‘best then worst’ processing order. When Alt2 is chosen as the best alternative,33
the Hamiltonian model renders an increased probability against the status quo as worst by shifting34
density for p(Alt3)(vs 1) for worst (blue) towards lower residual probability for Alt3 being second35
best, whilst shifting density for p(Alt1)(vs 3) for worst (red) towards higher residual probability for36
Alt1 being second best. In the ‘worst then best’ processing order, both models appear to use the37
same relative rotation transformation to produce the bias effect.38
We also note that both models show choice order effects, although not necessarily for the same39
25We notice a different cause of the choice probability p(Alt1)(vs 3) for worst alternative (red dots) in the Hamil-
tonian and amplitude model. In the amplitude model, the lowered probability (w.r.t. basic inversion) results from
convexity while in the Hamiltonian model it results from density (concentration towards higher probabilities in the
residual vector). These density shifts are related to the bias parameter in the initial state in the Hamiltonian model.
The same effect is present in the transformation for the choice probability p(Alt3)(vs 1) for worst alternative (blue
dots).
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FIGURE 8 : Choice probabilities of individual decision-makers generated by the quantum rotation
in the Hamiltonian model rotation [3] (top) and the amplitude model - rotation [2] (bottom) and,
choice of best alternative then worst (left) and choice of worst alternative then best (right). The
rotation transforms the probability amplitude of the second best choice into the worst choice (left
panels), and of the second worst choice into the best choice (right panels). The combinations of
chosen alternatives have been consistently colour coded across choice order and models (i.e. red
corresponds to Alt1 as worst, and Alt2 as best in all four graphs). The ‘basic inversion’ relation,
Equation (19), which switches the residual probabilities for best (worst) alternative into worst
(best) alternative is marked with black dots and serves to gauge the effect of the optimal quantum
rotations.
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combinations of best and worst choice. For instance, the combination Alt2 worst and Alt3 best1
does not show significant order effects in the amplitude model, nor in the Hamiltonian model. On2
the other hand, Alt1 best and Alt2 worst is oppositely transformed in both choice orders in the3
Hamiltonian model, while on the other hand in the amplitude model Alt2 best and Alt1 worst is4
oppositely transformed.5
The optimised proportion parameter has shifted the weight moderately towards the ‘worst then6
best’ choice order in both models (order ratio 0.39/0.61 for the Hamiltonian model and 0.36/0.647
for amplitude model). This feature is likely a result of the strong bias in the choice for worst8
alternative which would formally be captured more easily by an immediate implementation in the9
belief state (for the Amplitude model) and by a dynamical process (in the Hamilton model), than10
by a rotation. In the ‘worst then best’ order, both models do not invoke the rotation to render11
the probabilities for the worst choice, while in the reverse order ‘best then worst’ the rotation is12
involved in the final stage of producing the worst choice probabilities.2613
To analyse the impact of these rotations in relation to the effects they have on model outputs,14
we consider the overall predicted choice shares across the different models (see Table 9).15
TABLE 9 : Observed and predicted choice shares from different best-worst models
Best choice 1 1 2 2 3 3 Average deviation
Worst choice 2 3 1 3 1 2 from observed
Utility [2] 20.4% 14.3% 9.1% 25.8% 6.0% 24.3% 0.5%
DFT [2] 20.0% 14.3% 9.4% 25.1% 6.3% 24.8% 0.3%
q-Hamiltonian [3] 20.6% 19.1% 9.9% 19.9% 9.6% 20.8% 3.0%
q-Hamiltonian [6] 20.1% 14.9% 9.7% 25.0% 6.1% 24.2% 0.2%
q-Amplitude [3] 20.6% 19.1% 9.8% 20.0% 9.6% 20.9% 2.9%
q-Amplitude [5] 18.8% 14.5% 11.0% 24.9% 6.1% 24.7% 0.5%
Observed share 19.8% 14.9% 9.8% 25.1% 5.8% 24.6%
The average deviation from the observed choice share of best and worst choice demonstrates the16
impact of the quantum rotation on the quantum models with a quantum rotation. Hamiltonian17
and amplitude models without a quantum rotation have deviations of 3.0% and 2.9% respectively.18
These deviations are substantially reduced by moving to versions of the models with quantum ro-19
tations, which brings the results in line with those of the utility and DFT models, with the Hamil-20
tonian model in particular almost perfectly capturing the observed choice shares.21
Finally, we consider the parameter outputs for the best version of each model in Table 10.22
All four models give the expected sign for all of the attributes. Whilst the relative importance23
of the different attributes is similar across the models, there are some exceptions. In particular,24
the estimates for travel fare (LF) for the worst choices in the utility and DFT models are very25
different, with DFT giving the lowest relative importance to travel fare in both best and worst26
choice. DFT gives a higher importance to the rate of delays (RA) and the provision of a free27
information service (IFR) than other models. The quantum models provide very similar relative28
26Further examination of this order effect could be done in a dataset with explicit choice order specifications in the
survey.
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TABLE 10 : Parameter estimates from the models for the UK best worst dataset, with rel. weight
giving the relative importance of the different attributes.
Model Utility DFT q-Hamiltonian q-Amplitude
Parameters 24 26 19 15
Log-likelihood -5,607.63 -5,569.04 -5,633.44 -5,612.08
BIC 11,430 11,371 11,437 11,365
choice best worst best worst all all
LL contribution -3561.75 -2045.88 -3536.743 -2032.30
βT T
est. -0.0259 -0.0221 -0.1942 -0.0414 -0.0096 -0.2716
rob. t-rat. -5.96 -3.77 -6.55 -3.56 -9.75 -5.85
rel. weight 0.5% 0.3% 0.7% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5%
βLF
est. -5.3428 -7.2843 -25.0410 -7.1054 -1.7815 -46.6046
rob. t-rat. -4.78 -6.14 -7.84 -4.31 -9.42 -5.69
rel. weight 93.0% 93.4% 89.5% 81.6% 91.0% 92.2%
βCR
est. -0.1235 -0.2333 -0.8419 -0.3671 -0.0506 -1.2673
rob. t-rat. -4.43 -4.29 -5.57 -3.77 -8.71 -5.58
rel. weight 2.2% 3.0% 3.0% 4.2% 2.6% 2.5%
βRA
est. -0.0778 -0.0019 -0.6702 -0.3897 -0.0506 -0.9285
rob. t-rat. -3.19 -2.88 -4.04 -3.22 -4.92 -3.69
rel. weight 1.4% 0.0% 2.4% 4.5% 2.6% 1.8%
βRE
est. -0.0042 -0.0077 -0.0290 -0.0098 -0.0016 -0.0435
rob. t-rat. -1.47 -1.3% -2.18 -1.47 -2.56 -2.75
rel. weight 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
βRB
est. -0.0101 -0.0025 -0.0760 -0.0239 -0.0037 -0.0792
rob. t-rat. -1.75 -0.18 -2.06 -1.24 -2.08 -2.42
rel. weight 0.2% 0.0% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2%
βICH
est. -0.0333 -0.0006 -0.2345 -0.1779 -0.0073 -0.5012
rob. t-rat. -1.19 -0.90 -1.06 -0.77 -0.71 -1.98
rel. weight 0.6% 0.0% 0.8% 2.0% 0.4% 1.0%
βIFR
est. 0.1254 0.2494 0.8986 0.5957 0.0529 0.8245
rob. t-rat. 4.33 2.7% 4.49 3.49 5.2 3.07
rel. weight 2.2% 3.2% 3.2% 6.8% 2.7% 1.6%
λ1
est. 0.3272 5.1126 0.0438 0.4302 1.3547 0.0391
rob. t-rat. 4.38 3.16 3.31 2.74 11.06 4.56
λ2
est. 1.8508 0.3102 1.0000
rob. t-rat. 1.69 7.73 fixed
δ1
est. 0.0000 0.0000 1.9037 1.2919 2.8439
rob. t-rat. fixed fixed 6.55 5.94 5.79
δ2
est. -0.3029 -1.0826 1.1384 -0.9907 8.2458
rob. t-rat. -2.69 -14.72 4.09 -5.1 7.05
δ3
est. -0.5260 -0.7559 0.0000 0.0000 5.7360












rob. t-rat. fixed fixed
t
est. 7.1019 5.4830
rob. t-rat. (vs. 1) 8.52 4.53
φ1
est. 0.0040 0.0000
rob. t-rat. 2.67 fixed
φ2
est. 0.3469 0.0000









rob. t-rat. 6.71 7.96
ϑ
est. 1.3718 2.2353
rob. t-rat. (vs. π/2) -5.25 13.82
ωBW
est. 0.1346 1.2641
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importances to the utility model. All models suggest that there are differences between best and1
worst choice, with both the utility model and DFT in particular finding different sensitivities to2
cost when comparing best to worst. Additionally, both find substantially lower estimates for δ2 in3
worst choice compared to best, which is in line with observed choice shares for the 2nd alternative4
(best-35%, worst-44%). For the quantum models, we observe angles ϑ , and ω estimates, that5
are significantly different from π/2 and 0 respectively, which would correspond to best being the6
opposite of worst for the Hamiltonian model (with ω also significantly different from π/2 for the7
amplitude model, equivalently demonstrating that it too suggests that best is not the opposite of8
worst).9
5.5. Validation results: Holdout method10
We also test for overfitting, by testing the best performing model (in terms of BIC) for each of the11
four different types of model in our best-worst data. This corresponds to a separate parameters12
model for the utility and DFT models, and to models with quantum rotations and a proportion13
parameter for the Hamiltonian and amplitude models (2 rotations for the Hamiltonian, but just one14
for the amplitude model). We fit the data to 5 estimation subsets and then estimate the out-of-15
sample log-likelihood for the remaining validation subset. In each case, 80% of the (participants16
in the) dataset are assigned to the subset that is used for model estimation, with the remaining 20%17
used for validation. The log-likelihoods of these models are given in Table 11.18
TABLE 11 : The log-likelihood results for the estimation and holdout samples for the different
models for the UK best-worst dataset
Utility DFT q-Hamiltonian q-Amplitude
pars. LL pars. LL pars. LL pars. LL
estimation 1 24 -4,508.98 26 -4,471.93 19 -4,522.45 15 -4,519.58
estimation 2 24 -4,420.34 26 -4,394.00 19 -4,439.09 15 -4,412.87
estimation 3 24 -4,526.41 26 -4,498.69 19 -4,540.49 15 -4,529.31
estimation 4 24 -4,486.07 26 -4,462.50 19 -4,500.03 15 -4,498.81
estimation 5 24 -4,468.13 26 -4,426.69 19 -4,480.68 15 -4,472.40
holdout 1 24 -1,106.20 26 -1,104.27 19 -1,106.51 15 -1,097.21
holdout 2 24 -1,193.77 26 -1,183.34 19 -1,190.84 15 -1,205.68
holdout 3 24 -1,084.95 26 -1,073.84 19 -1,086.96 15 -1,084.99
holdout 4 24 -1,125.21 26 -1,110.85 19 -1,127.82 15 -1,117.01
holdout 5 24 -1,143.46 26 -1,148.45 19 -1,146.99 15 -1,141.51
The results suggest that neither the quantum models nor DFT overfit the data, with DFT giving19
the best fit in all 5 estimation and 3 of the validation subsets, and the amplitude model having the20
best fit in the other two validation subsets. The BIC values for these models are given in Figure21
9, which penalises the utility and DFT models. This consequently results in the amplitude model22
obtaining the best BIC value across all 5 estimation and validation subsets.23
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FIGURE 9 : The BIC results for the estimation and holdout samples for the different models for
the UK best-worst dataset
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5.6. Elasticities from value of time datasets1
In this section, we look at elasticities from the best version of each model (in terms of BIC) for the2
Swiss value of time and UK value of time datasets. For all models, we estimate an arc elasticity3







where ‘Base Trips i’ is calculated as the sum over the probabilities of choosing alternative i across5
all choice tasks in the dataset, with ‘Forecasted Trips i’ calculated equivalently but with adjusted6
attributes. The corresponding cross elasticities, CE j, estimate the impact on the probability of7
choosing alternative j given a change to an attribute of alternative i. We estimate elasticities by8
using a 10% increase of the controlling factor (see Equation 40), either travel time or travel cost9
for alternative 1, with the results given in Table 12. We estimate standard errors for the elasticities10
by taking 30 draws for the parameter values from the corresponding model estimates and robust11
covariance matrices.12
TABLE 12 : Arc elasticities for an increase in travel time or travel cost for the first alternative in
the value of time datasets
UK Value of Time dataset
arc elasticities for cost (alt1) arc elasticities for time (alt1)
est s.d. t-value (vs utility) est s.d. t-value (vs utility)
Utility -1.5600 0.0617 -2.0476 0.0393
DFT -1.7962 0.0488 -3.00 -2.2205 0.0467 -2.83
q-Hamiltonian -0.9335 0.0564 7.49 -1.6876 0.0766 4.18
q-Amplitude -1.8411 0.0473 -3.62 -2.4337 0.0647 -5.10
Swiss Value of Time dataset
arc elasticities for cost (alt1) arc elasticities for time (alt1)
est s.d. t-value (vs utility) est s.d. t-value (vs utility)
Utility -1.6641 0.2380 -1.4043 0.1241
DFT -1.6304 0.1406 0.12 -1.3705 0.0773 0.23
q-Hamiltonian -1.3034 0.1700 1.23 -1.1648 0.0890 1.57
q-Amplitude -1.7363 0.1454 -0.26 -1.4199 0.0948 -0.10
For the UK dataset, we observe significantly lower elasticities for the Hamiltonian model, and13
significantly higher elasticities for the amplitude model (relative to the utility model). There are14
equivalent results for both cost and time elasticities, with the amplitude and Hamiltonian models15
predicting greater and smaller shifts, respectively, away from choosing alternative 1 if the cost or16
time increases, relative to the utility model. For the Swiss dataset, we observe similar patterns to17
the UK dataset for the quantum models, but these differences are never significant. The elasticities18
from all models are higher than would be expected, though this is of course typical for SP datasets.19
Overall, the elasticities from the best performing quantum model (the amplitude model) appear20
reasonable in comparison to the elasticities given by the utility model.21
Hancock, Broekaert, Hess and Choudhury 42
6. CONCLUSIONS1
In this paper, we move away from the tried and tested alternatives to random utility maximisation2
by considering ideas first developed in quantum physics. With the probability framework devel-3
oped in quantum physics having made a successful transition to cognitive psychology, we look at4
whether it can be operationalised into a choice model framework for transportation studies. Under5
quantum probability theory, a decision-maker has some ‘belief state’ regarding their preferences6
over alternatives, from which the probabilities of each alternative can be inferred. Thus a key com-7
ponent of this paper is the development of specifications for the belief state and how these beliefs8
change through the process of decision making.9
We discuss two very different formulations for models generating belief states which incor-10
porate quantum probability theory within a choice model. The first uses a Hamiltonian operator11
that dynamically evolves the belief state over time. The second is based on directly estimating the12
probability amplitudes of the belief state for each of the alternatives. We find that our quantum13
models provide good model fit and outperform standard utility-based models across three route14
choice datasets as well as providing good out-of-sample fit for the most complex of these. In com-15
parison to Decision Field Theory (DFT), which has also been shown to outperform standard choice16
models (Hancock, 2019), our quantum models also perform favourably, with the amplitude models17
recording the best BIC values across all datasets. Additionally, we find good model performance18
from our quantum Hamiltonian model, although it appears that in the particular choice contexts we19
test it, the quantum amplitude model performs better. These positive results from our initial tests20
on quantum choice models suggest that there is ample scope for models with a quantum framework21
to be used within travel behaviour modelling.22
In order to perform fair tests of our quantum choice models against utility-based models and23
Decision Field Theory, we discuss four different value functions that are used to implement the24
attribute differences into the choice models. Overall, it often appears that the value functions25
themselves have a larger impact on model results than the model structure, with the ADLD models26
for the UK value of time data in particular giving very similar log-likelihoods across models with27
vastly different paradigms. However, with the exception of linear difference models, it appears28
that our quantum amplitude model tends to outperform the utility-based models. This exploration29
of different value functions also leads to the development of a first DFT model which specifically30
implements non-linear attribute differences. This results in a significant improvement in our DFT31
model across all datasets, with a substantial improvement recorded for the UK value of time dataset32
in particular.33
A key benefit of the quantum amplitude model over DFT is that it is simple to run and estimate,34
meaning that it could be applied to a wide range of choice scenarios. However, for these models to35
make a transition into large-scale modelling, an alternative specification would need to be defined36
to avoid the same pitfall of random regret minimisation for large numbers of alternatives: using37
a comparison between every pair of alternatives quickly becomes computationally infeasible and38
quantum amplitude models with linear attribute differences perform worse than standard multino-39
mial logit models. Another issue with the current specifications of the quantum models is that it40
could be argued that it is unclear how specifically the use of real and imaginary numbers improves41
the quantum models, with further work being required to understand the mechanisms at work here.42
Additionally, by restricting the belief state to be defined by the value functions tested in this paper,43
we deny the possibility of having a probabilistic belief state, as conceptualised by quantum theory.44
This limitation can easily be addressed through the incorporation of random parameters for the rel-45
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ative importance of the different attributes, which would naturally allow for a probabilistic belief1
state.2
That being noted, the results from our quantum rotation models in this paper suggest that3
there is potentially a wide range of benefits of bringing quantum probability theory into choice4
models. Crucially, our best performing models for the best-worst dataset and the contextual choice5
dataset, after allowing for model complexity to be taken into account, are the amplitude models6
including a quantum rotation. This suggests that there is some merit in the concept of quantum7
rotation, which indicates a different set of basis vectors for choices are required for different choice8
tasks. For example, the belief state rotation works well for capturing the difference between best9
and worst choice. Despite the fact that the best-worst choices are related, the quantum rotation10
suggests that these choices are in fact incompatible: the choices cannot be made at the same time11
and consequently they may not follow the classical probability law of distributivity. This means12
that different choices may be observed depending on whether the decision-maker chooses the best13
or worst alternative first. The use of such information may also provide a number of insights for14
better specifications of quantum models that incorporate ‘best then worst’ or ‘worst then best’15
deliberation processes. An enhanced implementation of our quantum approach demonstrated and16
improved model performance by integrating both orderings of the choice process, ‘best then worst’17
and ‘worst then best’.18
While the quantum rotation findings here are just illustrative examples, these results demon-19
strate that there is major scope for future work within travel behaviour modelling. For example,20
large-scale models frequently aim to understand a series of related, sequential choices. Given the21
ability of quantum rotations to capture the translation between best and worst choices, they the-22
oretically should also work for a larger sequence of related choices where continuously adding23
on separate sets of parameters may not be possible. Ordering effects and state dependence may24
thus be well captured by models within a quantum framework. Furthermore, it may be possible25
to mitigate the impacts of contextual effects by applying the appropriate quantum rotation derived26
from other quantum models that account for the same effect. Future efforts could also compare27
quantum frameworks against other models that are specifically designed to deal with contextual28
effects, such as prospect theory or MLBA. Additionally, quantum choice models could be applied29
to experimental paradigms in which a nudge is involved in some of the choice tasks (for example, a30
scenario such as the environmentalism example discussed in the introduction of this paper). These31
future possibilities combined with the positive results in our empirical work mean that this paper32
serves as a proof-of-concept that quantum ideas can be incorporated into choice models aiming to33
understand travel behaviour.34
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APPENDIX: COMPARATIVE MODELS1
The logit model. We test our quantum models against standard choice models (McFadden, 1974;2
Train, 2003; Ben-Akiva et al., 2019) using the same value functions. For these models, we define3
the utility for an alternative i (dropping the indices for individual (n) and choice task (t)) as:4
Vi = εi +∑
j 6=i
∆i j, (A1)
where ∆i j is defined using one of the four value functions and εi is the unobserved portion of the5








for each individual (n) and choice task (t). Using this function together with the regret-based value7
functions would of course result in the wrong signs for the β -coefficients, thus we use −Vi and8
−Vj instead of Vi and Vj for these models. As we do not have this transformation in the quantum9
models, they instead use ∆ ji in place of ∆i j to ensure the correct sign for the β -coefficients.10
Decision Field Theory. We also test DFT, which was originally developed within mathemati-11
cal psychology (Busemeyer and Townsend, 1992, 1993), thus is very different to models based on12
econometric theory. The key assumption under a DFT model is that each alternative has a prefer-13
ence value that updates over time within a single choice context. The decision-maker considers the14
alternatives until they reach some internal threshold (similar to the concept of satisficing, where15
one of the alternatives is deemed ‘good enough’) or an external threshold (i.e. some time con-16
straint, where a decision-maker stops deliberating on the alternatives as a result of running out of17
time to make the decision). An example of a decision process under DFT is given in Figure A1.18
FIGURE A1 : An example of a decision-maker stopping upon reaching either an internal or
external threshold
In the example given in this figure, the decision-maker chooses different alternatives if they make19
their choice after reaching an internal threshold (which is represented by the horizontal line) on20
the 4th preference updating step or if they conclude after 10 steps upon reaching a time threshold.21
27Note that this is equivalent to the specification of the probability amplitude, ψi in Equation 3.
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Mathematically, DFT was originally operationalised for internal thresholds, with a full account1
of this variation of DFT given by Busemeyer and Townsend (1993). However, the DFT models2
we use in this paper is based on DFT with external thresholds (c.f. Roe et al. (2001) for the3
first version of DFT with external thresholds for multiple alternatives). For DFT with an external4
threshold, the preference values update stochastically as a result of the assumption that a decision-5
maker compares the alternatives using just a single attribute at each preference updating step.6
Consequently, the preference values for the alternatives update iteratively:7
Pt = S ·Pt−1 +Vt , (A3)
where Pt is a column vector containing the preference values of each alternative i at time t. S is8
a feedback matrix with memory and sensitivity parameters (detailed in Equation A4) and Vt is a9
valence vector (Equation A5), which varies depending on which attribute is attended to at time t,10
and is equivalent to a ‘momentary utility’. The feedback matrix we use is based on the definition11
by Hotaling et al. (2010):12
S = I −φ2 × exp(−φ1 ×D2), (A4)
where I is an identity matrix of size n, where n is the number of alternatives. The feedback13
parameter has two free parameters. The first, φ1, is a ‘sensitivity’ parameter, which allows for14
competition between alternatives that are more similar (in terms of attribute values). This is the15
driving force that results in DFT being able to account for contextual effects (Roe et al., 2001). The16
second parameter, φ2 is a ‘memory’ parameter, which captures whether attributes considered at the17
start of the deliberation process or attributes considered at the end are more important. Crucially,18
a value of φ2 = 0 results in the feedback matrix collapsing to an identity matrix, meaning that ‘no19
memory loss’ results in it not being possible for φ1 to have an impact. This means that φ2 has20
an important mathematical role in the model and thus cannot be purely treated as a psychological21
parameter, which is especially the case when DFT is applied to choice-only data. Finally, D is22
some measure of distance between the alternatives. In this paper, we use the Euclidean distance23
for simplicity. Next, the valence vector can be described:24
Vt =C ·M ·Wt + εt , (A5)
where C is a contrast matrix used to rescale the attribute values such that they total zero, M is a25
matrix containing the attribute values for all of the alternatives, Wt = [0..1..0]
′ is a column vector26
and εt is an error term. Wt defines which attribute is being attended to by the decision-maker27
at preference updating step t, with entry k = 1 if and only if attribute k is the attended attribute.28
Note that the DFT models in this paper follow the new attribute scaling method developed by29
Hancock et al. (2020). Instead of estimating attribute importance weights, wk, that corresponds30
to the likelihood of a decision-maker attending to that attribute k, we estimate ‘attribute scaling31
coefficients’. These have many benefits (see Hancock et al. (2020) for a detailed explanation of32
these), including, most importantly, avoiding the limitation of having to sum to one. By instead33
assuming that each attribute is attended to with the same likelihood (all weights, wk = 1/n), the34
relative importance can instead enter as a set of scaling coefficients, βk, which are applied to the35
attributes before they are entered (through M in Equation A5) into the calculation of the valence36
vector at each preference updating step.37
Finally, the error term is drawn from independent and identically distributed normal draws38
with mean 0 and a standard deviation, σε , which is an estimated parameter. Consequently, the39
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preference values Pt converge to a multivariate normal distribution (Roe et al., 2001). To calculate1
the probability with which each alternative is chosen under decision field theory, we simply require2
the expectation and covariance of Pt (ξt and Ωt , respectively, detailed in Hancock et al. 2018).3















with X the set of differences between the preference value for the chosen alternative and each5
other alternative, X = [Pt [ j]−Pt [1] , ...,Pt [ j]−Pt [J]]′. Additionally, we require transformations of6
the expectation and covariance, Γ = Lξt , Λ = LΩtL
′, with L a matrix comprised of a column vector7
of 1s and a negative identity matrix of size J−1 where J is the number of alternatives. The column8
vector of 1s is placed in the ith column where i is the chosen alternative.9
Prior to this paper (as far as the authors are aware), DFT has always been implemented using10
linear attribute differences, which are enforced by the contrast matrix, C. This results in element j11
of the matrix C ·M ·Wt taking the form:12




βk(x jk − xik)
n
, (A7)
where n is the number of alternatives as before and k is the attribute being attended to at preference13
updating step t. Given that the value functions incorporating a softplus function do not result in14
∆i j = ∆ ji, they are not appropriate functions to be used within a DFT model. This is because15
DFT models use just a single difference ∆i j, thus it is unclear whether ∆i j or ∆ ji should be used.16
However, our ADLD value function can be configured such that ∆i j = ∆ ji, if λ1 = λ2. Thus our17
ADLD DFT models require just a single λ parameter. The element CMWt [ j] can thus have an18
updated numerator based on the ADLD value function:19






−λ ·βk · |x jk − xik|
)
·βk · (x jk − xik)
n
. (A8)
It is worth noting here that we do not sum across attributes for each preference updating step,20
though to calculate the expectation of the preference values after t steps, a summation is required.21
